

RELOOKING SACRED COWS: THE EIGHT NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.B.A., University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

RE-LOOKING SACRED COWS: THE EIGHT NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT DIVISIONS
by MAJ Eric G. Clayburn, USA, 116 pages.

The Cold War has ended and the Department of Defense has just completed a Bottom-Up Review. This thesis looks at what role the National Guard and in particular the force structure that the eight divisions will play in the national security strategy. The force structure of the divisions are deemed by some to be excess. This force structure does not have a current wartime mission. This thesis analyzes the Bottom-Up Review, Roles and Mission Study, the force structure of the National Guard and the federal and state missions required of these forces.

The results of the thesis determined that the force structure of the National Guard is improperly allocated. This improper allocation and the failure to assign valid missions to all of the forces of the National Guard leads many to believe that there is excess force structure within the National Guard. There is a shortage of CS and CSS units that has been identified by the recently completed Total Army Analysis. Some of the force structure of the National Guard divisions should be converted and assigned these missions. The remaining divisions are required to accomplish postmobilization training of the enhanced brigades and military support to civilian authorities.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background, Scope, and Importance

The Cold War has ended. The former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact no longer exist. The threat that drove U.S. Department of Defense decision making for four and a half decades--that determined U.S. military strategy, tactics, doctrine, size and shape of U.S. forces, the design of U.S. weapons, and the size of U.S. defense budgets--has disintegrated.¹ The active force structure of the U.S. Army is shrinking to match the departure of the U.S. superpower foe. The various missions and requirements of the active U.S. Army force structure have failed to decrease commensurately with the force structure. This situation demands that the U.S. Army rely more heavily on its reserve component force structure. The U.S. Army has two principal reserve components, the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. An analysis of the force structure of the eight National Guard divisions is the focus of this thesis.

The Department of Defense has mandated the force structure of the active components be cut from an eighteen to a ten division force. The active force structure of the Army is currently being reduced to 495,000 soldiers, and there are political inquiries considering taking the active force structure to 475,000. The reserve component force structure is currently undergoing a similar reduction. The current force structure plan reduces the Army National Guard (ARNG) to 405,000 spaces and a personnel end strength of 367,000 by fiscal year 1999.

This plan includes a maneuver force of eight divisions, fifteen "enhanced brigades," and three strategic reserve brigades."

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) also will be reduced significantly to a post-Cold War force of 230,000 soldiers. Like the regular Army, the Army Reserve will lose more than one-third of its force by the time the drawdown is complete in 1999.³ There also will be an internal shift of some units within the Army's reserve components. The USAR has stood down almost all of its infantry, armor, and artillery units and released other combat units, to include Special Forces and aviation assets, to the Army National Guard. It received combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units from the Army National Guard in return making it the largest CSS element in the Army.

The national military strategy (NMS) will continue to require these forces to accomplish two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) with a smaller active force. The national security strategy (NSS) also requires the Total Army force to be capable of conducting military operations for lesser regional contingencies (LRC) and military operations other than war (MOOTW).

The Bottom-Up Review and the Roles and Missions Study have identified the eight combat divisions of the National Guard as being excess to the Total Army force structure. These divisions do not have an assigned or implied mission to mobilize, deploy, or participate in any of the contingency scenarios of either study. This thesis will examine the current roles and missions assigned to the National Guard by the federal and state governments to determine if the Department of Defense is obtaining the best return on the resources applied to the National Guard force structure and in particular the eight combat divisions.

Assumptions

The Bottom-Up Review and the Roles and Missions Study use the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy to determine the required force structure of the "Total Force Army." Through the use of illustrative planning scenarios and computer models, these studies have determined the requirements of the post-Cold War "Total Force Army." Debate continues to linger about the capabilities of this force to win two near simultaneous MRCs. For the purpose of this thesis, the force structure requirements identified for each contingency and nearly simultaneous contingencies are assumed to be capable of winning.

Secretary of Defense William Perry has initiated a follow-on study to the Roles and Missions Study. The follow-on study is not completed, and no target date for the release of findings from this thesis has been set. This thesis assumes that the findings of the follow-on study will be in line with its two predecessors in reference to Army force structure.

Key Terms

Some definitions of key terms used throughout the thesis are:

Bottom-Up Review (BUR): This review was directed by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to identify force structure, modernization efforts, and new defense initiatives to allow the United States to maintain the capabilities to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."

Combatant Commander: A commander of one of the unified or specified commands established by the President of the United States. A unified command is a multiservice command under one commander to perform a broad and continuing mission. A specified command is a

single service command under one commander to accomplish a broad and continuing mission. At present there are no specified commands.⁵

Enhanced Brigade: A combat brigade configured with three maneuver battalions, one support battalion, direct support artillery battalion, engineers, and other assets. This unit is compatible with and supportable by active divisions and corps. The term enhanced refers to increased resource and manning priorities, with improved training strategies, to enable these brigades to deploy within 90 days after call up.⁶

Functions: The specific responsibilities assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.⁷

Missions: The tasks assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.⁸ The combatant commanders and subordinate commanders then assign missions to their subordinate commands.

National Guard Division (NGD): There are eight divisions within the Army National Guard. Each division consists of seven brigade-sized units; three maneuver brigades (infantry, mechanized infantry, or armor), one division support command, one division artillery brigade, one engineer brigade, and one aviation brigade. The divisions average between thirteen thousand and fifteen thousand personnel each.⁹

National Military Strategy (NMS): A document published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as needed that articulates how the military instrument of power will be used to carry out the National Security Strategy.¹⁰

National Security Strategy (NSS): A document published annually by the President that articulates the strategy of the nation.¹¹

Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflict: The U.S. currently has contingencies for two regional conflicts: one in Korea, named Major Regional Conflict (MRC) West and the other in Southwest Asia, named MRC East. If a second conflict were to break out weeks following the initial conflict, this would be called nearly simultaneous. Nearly simultaneous MRCs would result in a major strain on U.S. Military resources.¹²

Reserve Component Off-Site Agreement (commonly referred to as the Off-Site Agreement): An agreement by the senior leaders of the Active Army, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and the associations representing each component's members that produced a major restructuring initiative that was signed by the Secretary of Defense on 10 December 1993.¹³

Roles: Broad and enduring purposes specified by the Congress in law for the services and selected Department of Defense (DOD) components.¹⁴

Roles and Missions Study: This study was commissioned by Congress. "Congress believes that changes are required in the allocation of roles and missions, today and for the future, to ensure that the nation will have properly prepared military forces for the challenges ahead."¹⁵

Total Army: The active component forces, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) forces, and the Army National Guard (ARNG) forces that make up the Total Army. The reserve components contain essential parts of the U.S. Army which are required for the Army to undertake almost any type of deployment.¹⁶

Total Army Analysis (TAA): The Total Army Analysis is a multi-phased force structuring process. It consists of both quantitative and qualitative analyses to generate tactical support forces and general purpose forces necessary to sustain and support the divisional and nondivisional combat forces. The TAA is a biennial process conducted during even numbered years. The analysis is followed in the odd-numbered year by a Force Integration Analysis. The Army then releases a message of changes it has decided to integrate into the force structure. A Total Army Analysis was completed in late 1995, this analysis projects forces out to fiscal year 2003 and is titled TAA-03.¹⁷

Total Force Policy: "The totality of organizations, units, and manpower that comprise the Defense Department's resources for meeting the national military strategy."¹⁸ A directive to promote reduced response time for reserve components to augment an active unit in a national emergency. "The Total Force concept grew out of U.S. experience in the Korean Conflict, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and the Vietnam Conflict and recognized two new realities: the end of the draft and the decline in defense budget."¹⁹ This policy was adopted on 21 August 1970 by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

Literature Review

Several articles were written in the early 1970s on the force structure and deployment of reserve component forces after the August 1970 introduction of the Total Force Policy. Articles, studies, and books examine the actions of reserve component forces in World War II, the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam Conflict. The last three years have seen many articles concerning the downsizing of the Total Army and the greater role the reserve components will play in our nation's National Security Strategy.

There are two annual publications that address the programs and status of the U.S. Army reserve components: The Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board; and the Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau. These publications are printed for the public record and distributed to the President of the United States and congressional leaders. The reports list the accomplishments of the reserve components over the past fiscal year and recommendations by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, for the reserve components over the next fiscal year. These reports are usually released in late April, after one-half of the fiscal year that the reports have recommendations for is over. These reports include the official numbers of state and federal missions accomplished by the reserve components. These reports contain information on the future training strategy and how to obtain optimal results from the dollars invested in the reserve component programs.

Key Works in the Field on This Topic

The question of a properly structured reserve component force to augment the active component forces dates back to the first term of President George Washington. The questions of force structure and roles and missions of the reserve components were redefined in the early 1970s when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced the "Total Force Policy." This policy increased interdependence of active and reserve forces.²⁰ In September of 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released the results of the Bottom-Up Review. This study determined force structure and support roles of the active and reserve components of the Total Army.²¹ The "Total Force Policy" and Roles and Missions Study are key documents that lay the groundwork for this thesis.

A key study currently in the field is authored by Charles E. Heller, published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. TOTAL FORCE: Federal Reserves and State National Guards examines the entire reserve component picture in the Department of Defense. Colonel Heller's study looks at the need for an organized, trained and well-equipped reserve component; the timely access to the forces that the Department of Defense requires; force structure of each component of the reserve forces; recent past and current missions these

forces have participated in; and the future roles and missions these forces will be called upon to accomplish with the downsizing of the active forces."

James H. Rowan, a U.S. Army colonel studying at the Naval War College, completed an article entitled Comparison of U.S. Army Reserve Component Mobilization and Utilization in Vietnam and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Colonel Rowan's study addresses the vision of General Creighton Abrams' Total Army Force and reserve component mobilization for combat. Colonel Rowan examined the capability of the reserve components for rapid call to active duty, equipment commonality to support and be supported by the active components, levels of training at call-up and required additional training, and formulation of comprehensive plans for training and integration with active component forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Shea, United States Marine Corps (USMC), a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, completed a research report entitled Total Force: Improving Reserve Component Readiness. Lieutenant Colonel Shea's report focused on the Army reserve component's capability to rapidly deploy forces to global contingencies. The report determined forces that performed technical duties related to civilian jobs and those related to a scientific skill versus an art skill (i.e., combat units) are easier for a reserve component unit to accomplish. Reserve combat units generally require a longer training period prior to deployment and are not capable of meeting rapid deployment schedules. Combat support and combat service support units are much easier to train in mission-related tasks and are more prepared for rapid deployment. Many reserve component personnel disagree with this finding. The active army counterparts point at the National Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) postmobilization

training at the National Training Center during Desert Shield/Storm and infer that combat units require no less than ninety days of postmobilization training.¹⁴

In the November 1995 issue of the Reserve Officer Association, "25th Anniversary of Total Force," former Secretary of Defense Laird made the following comment about the future of the Total Force:

I am impressed by the vision of Deborah Lee, the exceptionally capable Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, who has laid out a five point program:

1. We must renew our commitment to the Total Force and the traditional strengths of the Guard and Reserve.

2. We must size and shape the Guard and Reserve for new dangers.

3. We must make the Reserve components more accessible.

4. We must make the Reserve components ready to deploy when needed.

5. We must use the Reserve components-consistent with readiness-to help address problems here at home.

Secretary Lee's five points are a prescription for continuing the Total Force vigor and vitality.

This document makes evident the drive of the key DOD leaders to not only keep the Total Force concept alive but to make it the cornerstone of the post-Cold War Army force structure.¹⁵

Apparent Trends, Patterns, and Relationships to the Topic

The most apparent trend in the literature on future force structure of the reserve components for the Army is the growing amount of literature being published as the Army becomes more dependent on reserve component forces. The topic moves to the forefront after each conflict or war in which the United States requires the activation of the citizen soldier. The current trend for literature on this topic is centered around the greater role the reserve components will play in all contingencies with the reduction of the active component force structure to ten divisions.

The literature suggests that the reserve components can handle the greater role required of them within the National Military Strategy and the National Security Strategy.

Research Design

Primary and Secondary Questions

The primary research question is: Is the Total Army Force obtaining optimal use of the force structure invested in the eight National Guard divisions? The answer to this question will be limited to a yes or no response. The design of the research to answer this question is to divide this question into three secondary questions and each secondary question will have a few tertiary questions to be answered. The secondary question subgroups and their tertiary questions are:

1. Can the eight National Guard divisions perform their current federal missions?
 - a. What are the federal missions currently assigned?
 - b. Are the federal missions currently assigned valid?
 - c. Are the divisions trained to accomplish the currently assigned federal missions?
 - d. Are the divisions equipped to accomplish the currently assigned federal missions?
 - e. Are the divisions capable of mobilizing and deploying to accomplish their federal missions?
2. Can the eight National Guard combat divisions perform their current state missions?
 - a. What are the state missions currently assigned?
 - b. Are the state missions currently assigned valid?
 - c. Are the divisions trained to accomplish the currently assigned state missions within the time needed?

d. Are the divisions equipped to accomplish the currently assigned state missions?

e. Are the divisions capable of mobilizing and deploying to accomplish their state missions?

3. Are there critical force structure deficiencies identified in Total Army Analysis (TAA) 03 that are currently confronting the Total Army?

a. What type of units are identified as being shortages for the Total Army by TAA-03?

b. Are there shortage units identified by the TAA that would provide military assets (trained personnel and equipment) to better assist the governors in accomplishing state missions?

c. Can some units under the current divisional force structure be converted to TAA-03 shortage units and retain Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and equipment?

The information needed to answer these questions will come from unclassified reports, briefings, publications, and direct conversations. Documents that will be examined are current National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, Bottom-Up Review, Roles and Missions Study findings, current command information briefings of the National Guard divisions, the Defense Planning Guidance, results of TAA-03, and relevant General Accounting Office reports. Access to most of these materials will be obtained from the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The criteria used to determine validity of the information used throughout this thesis will be investigation by cross-checking data with multiple sources and direct verification with the offices and headquarters identified as sources.

Contributions This Study May Make

The intent of this thesis is to analyze the current requirements the Total Army force has placed on the National Guard. What roles and missions are assigned or could be assigned to the eight National Guard Combat Divisions under the Bottom-Up Review and the Roles and Missions Study findings? Is the current force structure in the eight National Guard divisions being utilized to provide maximum dividends to the Total Force Army and the state governors? This analysis will determine what roles and missions are assigned or could be assigned to the eight National Guard combat divisions. The active components of the Total Force Army are operating at or near maximum capacity. If new roles and mission requirements are assigned to the Total Force Army, some of the current assignments will be cascaded to the National Guard.

This thesis may determine more efficient uses of the force structure of the eight National Guard combat divisions. The thesis may determine that this force structure can be better used as units that are more responsive to the needs of the state and the federal governments for natural disasters, civil disturbance and military operations other than war.

Limitations of the Study

The Bottom-Up Review and the Roles and Mission Study are used as a basis for determining required Total Army force structure. While planning scenarios used in the above studies are not actual operational or contingency plans, they give a reasonable depiction of force requirements for missions within the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

Significance of the Study

The thesis will produce a strategy for potentially changing the force structure of the eight National Guard divisions to better accomplish the roles and missions assigned to the Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau. The thesis will determine if there is a problem with proper utilization of the force structure within the eight divisions or if some or all of the force structure within the divisions is excess.

The thesis will determine if there are higher priority force structure requirements of the Total Army that are not being resourced, and if adequate force structure exists to execute the assigned missions of state and federal governments. It will address the use of any force structure that is determined to be in excess of current and known future requirements. Recommendations will be made to reallocate force structure that is not properly utilized. In making recommendations this thesis will examine what requirements of the national military strategy and Total Army Analysis-03 are unresourced. Other uses, for force structure that is determined to be excess, are:

1. creating a primary force to perform military operations other than war (MOOTW) on the federal and state level.
2. converting the force structure to brigade size combat units (strategic/deterrent hedge) that are capable of completing postmobilization training and being ready for deployment faster than a division.

If excess force structure is identified after the Army has resourced all requirements in TAA-03 and examined the above uses of excess force structure, this thesis will recommend the elimination of the excess force structure.

Endnotes

¹Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993), 1.

²John R. D'Araujo, U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, FY 1994, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 49.

³Katherine McIntire Peters, "New Force Plan Reshapes the Mission," Handbook for the Guard and Reserve 1995, (11 September 1995): 49.

⁴Aspin, iii.

⁵U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993), G-1.

⁶D'Araujo, 50.

⁷Aspin, 32.

⁸John O. Marsh, Jr., U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1994), 32.

⁹William Matthews, "Guard: From Combat to Support," Army Times 29 (12 February 1996): 22.

¹⁰John P. White, Report on the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 May 1995), G-6.

¹¹Ibid., G-7.

¹²Aspin, 7.

¹³D'Araujo, 50.

¹⁴White, 1-1.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Melvin R. Laird, "25th Anniversary of Total Force," The Officer: ROA National Security Report (November 1995): 20.

¹⁷U.S. Army War College, Army Command, Leadership, and Management: Theory and Practice 1992-1993 (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 11-12.

¹⁸Laird, 19.

¹⁹Ibid., 21.

²⁰Ibid., 19-22.

²¹Aspin, 7.

²² Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 September 1994), vii.

²³ Robert M. Shea, Total Force: Improving Reserve Component Readiness (Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, April 1992), 12-14.

²⁴ Laird, 21-22.

CHAPTER 2

THE WORLD CHANGES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHANGE IS DEMANDED:

THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

Background

The United States Department of Defense and its NATO Allies engaged the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in a Cold War from the end of World War II until the reunification of Germany in 1990. For many years people around the world had feared this Cold War and its military buildup, to include massive stocks of nuclear weapons on both sides. People wanted a change in their world. British author Elspeth Huxley said in 1907, "Only man is not content to leave things as they are but must always be changing them, and when he has done so, is seldom satisfied with the result."¹ The Cold War was a result of change as Nazism was defeated in Europe.

In August of 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, which it had long claimed. This invasion presented new regional dangers in a vital area that the United States and other democratic nations of the world could not allow to stand. Then President of the United States George Bush believed that this act of aggression by Iraq was a threat to the national security of the United States. This invasion if allowed to go unchecked could have led to two-thirds of the world's oil reserve being controlled by tyrants in a very unstable region of the world. On 17 January 1991, a U.S.-led coalition that included Britain, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and other nations began a massive air war to destroy Iraq's forces and military infrastructure. The coalition ground forces attacked into Kuwait and invaded Southern Iraq on 24 February 1991.

Over the next four days the U.S.-led coalition encircled and defeated the Iraqis and liberated Kuwait.

In 1991 the people of Russia (former Soviet Union) demonstrated their resolve toward moving to a democratic society by not allowing a "socialist" coup attempt to succeed. With this strong stand for democracy, Russia confirmed to the U.S. and other nations of the world that it was ready to join the democratic countries of the world.

All of the above and a new administration occupying the White House led to the political request for an analysis of the U.S. Department of Defense and its multibillion dollar budget. Many elected officials in Washington demanded that the Department of Defense be reviewed "from the bottom up." In March of 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated a comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. The completion of this study would produce a bottom-up review.

Purpose

The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities. Once the Bottom-Up Review was completed, Secretary Aspin held a press conference and discussed the following three points which the Bottom-Up Review accomplished:

First and foremost, the Bottom-Up Review provides the direction for shifting America's focus away from a strategy designed to meet a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward the new dangers of the post-Cold War era. Chief among the new dangers is that of aggression by regional powers.

One of the central factors in our analysis was the judgment that the United States must field forces capable, in concert with its allies, of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. This capability is important in part because we do not want a potential aggressor in one region to be tempted to take advantage if we are already engaged in halting aggression in another. Further, sizing U.S. forces to fight and win

two major regional conflicts provides a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary might one day confront us with a larger-than-expected threat.

Our analysis showed that we can maintain a capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts and still make prudent reductions in our overall force structure--so long as we implement a series of critical force enhancements to improve our strategic mobility and strengthen our early-arriving anti-armor capability, and take other steps to ensure our ability to halt regional aggression quickly.

Second, the review's results demonstrate to our allies, friends, and potential foes alike that the United States will remain a world power in this new era. We are not going to withdraw from our involvement around the world. While we no longer need to prepare for global war, the new dangers to our interests are global. Our review spelled out what military forces and capabilities will be needed to meet the new dangers.

Finally, the review lays the foundation for what is needed to fulfill President Clinton's pledge to keep America's military the best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared fighting force in the world.

Secretary Aspin's comments will be the guide as this thesis examines the force structure requirements of the National Guard as a part of the Total United States Army force structure. The National Guard force structure has a direct impact on the ability of the Army to accomplish the tasks presented in the National Military Strategy and an increased role within Secretary Aspin's review. This thesis will outline the foundations of the Bottom-Up Review which set the rationale for the defense strategy to determine force structure requirements as an outcome of the missions the U.S. Army would like to be able to accomplish. It is argued that in the past the U.S. Army has established a large force structure and then tailored the justifications to keep such a large force. The Bottom-Up Review was designed to sanction the right sizing of the Department of Defense and reduce American defense spending in conjunction with the end of the Cold War.

Analysis of Bottom-Up Review Foundations

This analysis of the Bottom-Up Review will focus on four of the building concepts (foundations) of the review: the new defense strategy; the forces to implement the new defense strategy; the major

regional conflict (MRC) concept; and lastly the building of the Total Army force structure.

New Defense Strategy

The new defense strategy is built upon the following four areas: nuclear dangers and opportunities, regional dangers and opportunities, new dangers to democracy and opportunities for democratic reform, and building future capabilities--guiding principles.

Nuclear Dangers and Opportunities

When nuclear dangers and opportunities were examined, three subcategories were noted as important. They are: Nonproliferation, cooperative threat reduction, and counterproliferation. The techniques and operations to be executed under these subcategories are intended to reduce stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through diplomatic channels, as well as being prepared to deter, prevent, or defend against a foe engaging in use of weapons of mass destruction. Nonproliferation seeks to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction to nonpossessing countries by limiting the flow of technologies/materials primarily through diplomatic channels. The term used to describe this within congressional and Department of Defense (DOD) circles and other agencies working arms control agreements and programs is cooperative threat reduction (CTR). Cooperative threat reduction seeks to foster the reduction of current nuclear, biological, and chemical stocks on hand and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their components, and related technology and expertise within and beyond former Soviet Union borders. Specific agreements (e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention) among the United States, Russia, and the breakaway republics of the former Soviet Union will eliminate the production, stockpiling, weaponization, and use of certain chemicals for all signatories of the convention. Counterproliferation targets

deterrence, prevention of use, and the actual defense against weapons of mass destruction if the previous tiers fail.³

Regional Dangers and Opportunities for Democratic Reform

The second point of the defense strategy is that of regional dangers and opportunities. These dangers and opportunities are derived from the U.S. involvement in major regional conflicts (e.g., Iraq-Desert Storm, defending South Korea); a need to maintain an overseas presence; and lastly, U.S. involvement in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other intervention operations, for example, the current conflict in Bosnia. The U.S. involvement in MRCs stems from the need to thwart aggression around the world--not as the world's policemen, but as allies with other nations who request U.S. assistance. This also serves to protect U.S. interests in those specific regions of the world where this aggression might readily occur (e.g., the Middle East and U.S. oil interests). The U.S. will maintain prepositioned stocks and stocks afloat in key locations around the globe from a necessity standpoint to allow rapid response/deployment to that respective area when called to do so. This rapid response is the only alternative to having a large segment of force structure remain on foreign soil. The current reductions in force structure have greatly reduced the U.S. Army's capability to station troops in overseas locations. Stationing a smaller force sends a message that U.S. presence is still in the region and has not abandoned the host nation nor removed itself completely. This deters adversaries from contemplating unwarranted actions had the U.S. force removed itself altogether. The peacekeeping, enforcement, and intervention operations all hover around the involvement of troops in operations other than of war. These operations establish the U.S. commitment to allies around the world in protecting vital interests and providing humanitarian assistance when necessary.

The units assigned to the eight National Guard divisions are capable of handling limited operations of these types. This could reduce the amount of time Active Component units are deployed and leave the enhanced brigades to train on warfighting basic skills and prepare for possible deployment to a MRC. Another scenario is to assign these missions to enhanced brigades that are not currently assigned or aligned with an MRC warfight.⁴

Dangers to New Democracies and Opportunities for Democratic Reform

The third point seeks to influence or to resolve any new dangers to democracy and those opportunities for democratic reform around the globe. Prime examples of this are the U.S. assistance in establishing democracies in the areas comprising the former Soviet Union; continuing this establishment in the Latin American region; and contributing economic aid, training assistance, and educational programs to strengthen countries in need. Within these new dangers, the military has specific objectives tied to nuclear dangers, regional dangers, dangers to democratic reform, and dangers to American economic prosperity.

Secretary Aspin mentioned several objectives tied to each of these (respectively): deter the use of NBC weapons against the U.S., its forces, and its allies; deter/defeat aggression in regions important to the U.S.; use military-to-military contacts to foster democracy; and actively assist nations in their transition from controlled market economies.⁵

The Cold War is over and there are a host of former Warsaw Pact countries and other nonaligned countries throughout the world that have shown great interest in establishing a democratic form of government. It must be remembered that this trend is reversible. The democracy movement in the former Soviet Union is not firmly established and market reforms have not produced any tangible improvements in the standard of living for the people. The governments of these countries are at risk

until tangible improvements can be seen by the people and their full support of the government is secured. The United States must stand ready to provide economic aid and other assistance to these countries until the impact of their reforms have secured the faith of their people.

The United States must establish partnerships with these nations. The nation must be ready to provide economic aid, training assistance, and defense to defense contacts to foster mutual understanding; provide assistance in reducing nuclear arsenals; provide assistance in the elimination of nuclear arsenals in former Soviet Union republics other than Russia; and solicit cooperation in regional security initiatives, such as multinational peacekeeping operations. The United States must also maintain and strengthen its bilateral and multilateral ties in central and eastern Europe as a hedge against possible reversals of democracy.

The National Guard has partnerships with twenty-six former communist states. The program is designed to assist states struggling from political and economical ruin after the Cold War. The National Guard is sending experts in subjects ranging from constitutional law to water purification. This is a valid use for citizen soldiers to assist with the national security strategy and not burden or tie up the active forces. Current Chief of the National Guard Bureau Lieutenant General Edward Baca stated, "Nobody is better qualified to go to the Eastern Bloc and talk about the military and democracy than citizen soldiers." The best use of force structure would commit civil affairs and echelons above division water purification units. This is a valid mission that supports the national security strategy and can be accomplished by properly trained citizen soldiers.⁶

The Building Of the Total Army Force Structure

It was determined that the new defense strategy was to be built around the capability of U.S. forces to support the following objectives of the national security and national military strategies: to meet the nuclear dangers and opportunities, to meet new regional dangers and seize the opportunities that exist to reduce these opportunities, to meet and support new dangers to democracy and opportunities for democratic reform, and to meet the dangers to American economic prosperity. A major purpose for U.S. defense strategy is building future capabilities. There are three guiding principles tied to these future capabilities.

1. Readiness, keeping our forces ready to fight. Having a trained and ready force capable of multi-tasked operations, and having equipment readily available from prepositioned stocks/positions around the globe.
2. Maintaining the quality soldier is paramount to successful operations. The soldier is the foundation for all successful engagements--for without him or her, the equipment and all its technological advantage will not engage, nor defeat the enemy.
3. Maintain technological superiority. Technology is extremely important because it fosters better planning and execution with added, timely information. This allows for a quick defeat of the enemy, thereby reducing casualties or losses of American lives. Technology is today and will continue tomorrow to be a force multiplier. Technology, although expensive, will provide great payoffs as the U.S. attempts to reduce the defense bill. Procurement of more efficient systems that can accomplish "more with less" is the goal of the acquisition system. Procurement of new technologies must be well planned to balance purchasing the right amount of equipment for verified needs versus buying more weapons than required or more weapons than we can afford.

This defense strategy will be implemented against "four broad classes of potential military operations" as discussed by Secretary Aspin:

- 1) Major regional conflicts;
- 2) Smaller-scale conflicts or crises that would require U.S. forces to conduct peace enforcement or intervention operations;
- 3) Overseas presence--the need for U.S. military forces to conduct normal peacetime operations in critical regions;
- 4) Deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction, either against U.S. territory, U.S. forces, or the territory and forces of U.S. allies. This list is not all-inclusive. We will provide forces and military support for other types of operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and to counter international drug trafficking.


The analysis of force structure resulted in a "modular approach" to designing forces which could be quickly tailored to specific and/or general scenarios currently at hand.

The tailored force built from various modules would then apply itself to the four phases of combat operations utilized in the Bottom-Up Review study. These were: halt the invasion, buildup U.S. combat power, defeat the enemy, and provide for postwar stability. Halting the invasion would involve using the host nation's assets combined with initial U.S. forces to hold the initial conditions from escalating too much further. Following this initial hold, the U.S. would continue to build up the area with the right force package against the enemy's capabilities or threatened action(s). The built-up forces, with other allies and the host nation, would soundly defeat the aggressor(s), followed immediately by these same assets providing assistance to transition to post-conflict stability.

The chart "Force Pool Dynamics Concurrent MRCs" (see figure 1) depicts the modular approach to winning two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously by using overseas presence, active forces, and reserve forces deployed via strategic lift and by relying on forward prepositioned sets of equipment. Force structure modifications, to include units being realigned, prepositioned equipment stocks being increased and aligned at strategic locations, and additional strategic

FIGURE 1

FORCE POOL DYNAMICS CONCURRENT MRCS



Source: TRADOC Combined Arms Center, Force Design Directorate, "ARMG Divisions Remissioning Brief," Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 1996, Slide 67-18.

sealift and airlift being procured, were required to execute this strategy.

The realigning of units has been completed for the Active Component, and the addition of prepositioned stocks and placing it in strategic locations is underway but will not be completed until the year 1999. The strategic lift posture has been improved with additional procurement of airframes and fast sealift ships. Additional lift procurement is needed to reduce the risk involved with conducting two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously. The realignment of force structure as prescribed in the Bottom-Up Review without the parallel force enhancements being in place raises the risk of the national security strategy for interim periods (see figure 2).⁶ The enhanced brigade require an affiliation with an active component higher headquarters that may control it during deployment and an alignment with a MRC wartime mission. This will provide the focus and vision that all units require to be successful. All enhanced brigade and divisions that remain in the force structure should be aligned with a geographical region and a wartime mission trace, much like the old CAPSTONE plan.

From an overall force structure perspective, the Army structure envisioned for the future (1999) is comprised of ten active divisions and five plus reserve divisions (these are the fifteen enhanced brigades and two strategic reserve brigades, which equal five plus division equivalents).

The Bottom-Up Review planners analyzed four options to arrive at the 1999 future structure. The four options were applied against four strategies or situations to determine the force mix to successfully accomplish the given mission.

Option one strategy is to win one MRC. This option requires the fewest resources. Choosing this option would leave the capabilities to fight only one MRC. This would leave U.S. security elsewhere vulnerable

FIGURE 2

FORCE OPTIONS FOR MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS

OPTION	1	2	3	4
STRATEGY	WIN One MRC	Win One MRC with Hold in Second MRC	Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs	Win Two Simultaneous MRCs Plus Conduct Smaller Operation Nearly
U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 Active Divisions • 6 Reserve Division Equivalents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 Active Divisions • 6 Reserve Division Equivalents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 Active Divisions • 15 Reserve Enhanced Readiness Brigades <p>Plus Force Enhancements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional Prepositioned Sets • Additional Fast Shipping 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 Active Divisions • 8 Reserve Enhanced Division Equivalents

SOURCE: Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, 1993); U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993), 27.

to the possibility that a potential aggressor might chose to take advantage of the situation with the majority of U.S. forces engaged in a conflict in another part of the world.

At a minimum, choosing this approach would require us to scale back or terminate certain existing mutual defense treaties and long-standing commitments, with a corresponding reduction in our influence in those regions where we chose to abandon a major leadership role.

This option would require a force structure of eight active divisions and six reserve division equivalents. (The term division equivalents is used to address the reserve force in terms of divisional units, i.e., three brigades are equal to one division.) The study was modeled using eighteen brigades of the National Guard. This force would have a very high operations tempo and could spend immense amounts of time deployed conducting operations other than war. Many estimated savings would have to be analyzed with the detrimental effects that would occur on morale and equipment wear and tear to get a true analysis of any potential savings. It is possible that a smaller force could actually cost more than a larger force on the bottom line. When selecting this option it is estimated that an undetermined amount of dollars can be saved and invested in other national priorities.

Option two strategy is to win one MRC and hold in the second MRC. This required ten active divisions and six reserve division equivalents. This option attempts to keep the U.S. global power position intact while assuming the following risk: U.S. national interest may be challenged in one region and the U.S. may respond with forces to win the major regional conflict. In the midst of the response to that aggression, U.S. national interests may be challenged in another region. The U.S. would then deploy a small force to contain and hold the second region. (This may require further deploying forward deployed units out of their current region.) The hold force also could be

defeated and overrun. Once the first regional conflict is won, the forces would deploy directly to the hold region and attempt to defeat the regional foe in this region. This option would lay a heavy burden on U.S. soldiers and the sealift and airlift to accomplish these two missions. "Choosing this option might provide sufficient military strength in peacetime to maintain America's global leadership, but it would heighten the risk in wartime associated with carrying out a two-MRC strategy."

This option also frees an undetermined amount of money to be applied to other national priorities. Once again these savings would require analysis to determine if they are true savings or shifting expenses to other areas such as procurement for additional sealift and airlift.

Option three strategy is to win two nearly simultaneously MRCs. This required ten active divisions and fifteen reserve enhanced readiness brigades. This option provides sufficiently capable and flexible military forces to position the United States to be a leader and shaper of global affairs for positive change. It allows the U.S. to carry forward with confidence the strategy of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously.

However, it leaves little other active force structure to provide other overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or other lower-intensity operations if we had to fight two MRCs at once. If such tasks became necessary, or if either MRC did not evolve as we anticipated, then we might be required to activate significant numbers of reserve component forces.

In option three the force model was successful when the following capability enhancements were added: additional prepositioning of brigade sets of equipment; increased stocks of antiarmor precision-guided munitions; more early-arriving naval air power; and formulation, training, and equipping of the fifteen enhanced brigades.

Option four strategy is to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs plus conduct smaller operations. This required twelve active divisions and eight reserve enhanced division equivalents. Option 4 would allow the U.S. to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously while continuing to sustain other overseas presence and perhaps an additional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other intervention type of operation.

However, to maintain forces of this size would require significant additional resources, thereby eliminating any "peace dividend" the American people are expecting as a result of the end of the Cold War. Yet our analysis showed that, despite this larger investment, Option 4 would provide only a small increment of increased military capability.¹¹

As the Bottom-Up Review planners applied weights in each of their analysis strategies, the bottom line of the Bottom-Up Review was dwindling resources. The force recommended for 1999 is based on specific budget constraints, the effect of the end of the Cold War implying a need for a smaller force, and determining the minimum essential force capable of the most (mission accomplishment) with what was to remain.

The Total Army concept of General Abrams and former Secretary of Defense McNamara has matured into a reality. The Bottom-Up Review requires rapid access and mobilization of reserve components for the United States military to be successful in almost all future endeavors. The Bottom-Up Review force increases the necessity of a presidential call up or solicitation for volunteers from reserve component force structure. The active Army does not have logistical nor psychological operations capabilities to respond to a lesser regional contingency and maintain the capability to rapidly deploy to a major regional contingency. The Bottom-Up Review Total Army Force built by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin requires integrated support from the reserve components. Secretary Aspin and the Clinton Administration had attempted to empower the Secretary of Defense with limited call-up

authority. This proposed legislation was debated in the United States House of Representatives and defeated. A regional danger like the current Bosnia mission (Operation Joint Endeavor) and deploying the current Implementation Force has shown that the Total Army force has new limitations that require volunteers or a presidential call-up of reserve forces.

Is the Bottom-Up Review reliable analysis?

In describing the methodology employed in the Bottom-Up Review to derive U.S. force structure requirements, General Colin Powell observed that the two-MRC planning requirement, which he described as a strategy, was converted into force requirements through a series of models and wargames and military analysis and discussion with our political leaders as to what is an acceptable risk or an unacceptable risk.¹¹ The two-MRC requirement was developed employing the Southwest Asia and Korea scenarios. The Pentagon planners used these scenarios and ran computer simulated models. Unfortunately, the Bottom-Up Review methodology in this area is rather opaque; i.e., it is not clear how the games were conducted, what assumptions were made, what factors were considered implicitly, or not at all.

Fighting Yesterday's Battle Tomorrow

Military analyst and planners have exhibited a tendency to develop a preference for a particular scenario for war planning purposes. This has been referred to by some as the "Canonical Scenario."¹² Historical scenarios are a good technique but it must always be remembered that wars rarely occur along the lines and assumptions anticipated by the scenario. History is rife with examples: witness the German General Staff's strategic bankruptcy after the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, the Israeli Defense Force's surprise at

the Arab assault that precipitated the Yom Kippur War, and the French Army's mistaken belief that its war with Germany in 1940 would evolve much as it had in 1914.¹⁴

The Bottom-Up Review methodology follows these pitfalls and runs the risk of falling into the trap of restricting its force planning to a Canonical Scenario--a major regional aggression conducted very much along the lines of the Iraqi attack against Kuwait in 1990. It assumes that the United States would have short notice of the impending attack. While the scenario developers anticipate the United States will often fight as the leader of a coalition, with allies providing some support and combat forces, the scenario assumes that U.S. force must be sized and structured to preserve the flexibility to act unilaterally. It assumes that the enemy would employ an operational concept very similar to that which the Iraqis employed, an armor heavy, combined arms offensive.¹⁵ Given this approach, two questions must be answered: First, are these scenario assumptions reasonable? Second, are they the only plausible assumptions?

It is possible that the United States would have little warning of pending regional aggression. History indicates that American forces have often been unprepared for the enemy's initial attack, as occurred in World War II, the Korean War, and the Gulf War. And it may be that the United States will find itself forced to fight without significant support from allies. It also is possible that an aggressor might choose to copy the Iraqis operational strategy that led to disaster. Thus one could conclude that the Bottom-Up Review is plausible. However, these assumptions--along with the assumption of nearly simultaneous aggression in another region--also constitute the best plausible case for the Cold War force structure of sixteen active divisions. This force structure is ideal for refighting the Gulf War more effectively.¹⁶

There are other scenarios that are just as plausible as those used by the Bottom-Up Review planners. One scenario that may have been used is based upon the assumption that U.S. forces are caught off guard in one or both situations of regional aggression. U.S. intelligence is highly unlikely to be caught off guard in two regions and it is unlikely that the United States would be engaged in two regional wars in defense of vital interest and not have at least one major ally not join in the common defense.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given Iraq's spectacular failure against the U.S.-led coalition, it is difficult to accept that future potential regional aggressors would attempt to repeat Baghdad's folly. It would seem far more likely that they will attempt to be highly innovative, both in the types of forces they field and the kind of military doctrine they employ. Employing these assumptions in the Pentagon's wargames would, in some instances, ease U.S. force requirements. In other instances, they would show a need to alter, perhaps dramatically, both U.S. force structure and operational concepts. Thus the Bottom-Up Review, by relying on a Canonical Scenario, may err significantly in its estimates of the level of U.S. Forces required, the mix of U.S. force required, and the operational concepts required to achieve success against an aggressor.

Measures of Effectiveness

How did the Bottom-Up Review planners measure the effectiveness of U.S. forces engaged in military operations? The analytic measures, or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) chosen can have a profound influence on the selection of U.S. operational concepts and force structure for regional conflict. Choosing the wrong measures can waste scarce resources, or worse, cost lives and lead to defeat in war. During the Cold War, for example, it was assumed that a Soviet measure of

effectiveness for an attack on Western Europe would be the rate of advance of Soviet forces. (It was believed that the Soviets felt a quick victory was required before problems with Warsaw Pact alliance cohesion, the greater economic resources of NATO, the threat of escalation to nuclear weapons, and other factors would compromise prospects for success.) Thus the ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact armored division equivalents on the central European front became an important factor for U.S. and allied war planners, influencing both operational concepts and force planning in the planners' efforts to slow the Soviet rate of advance. The intent was to reduce the rate of advance to levels that would convince Moscow that war with NATO was too risky to contemplate: i.e., that the Soviets would be deterred from going to war.

Choosing the wrong measures of effectiveness can be disastrous. For example, the U.S. Army's use of such measures as body counts, and the rate and level of ordnance expenditures during the Vietnam War proved inappropriate for the conflict environment. Attempting to meet these measures of effectiveness actually decreased, overall, the Army's prospects for achieving the goals of its attrition strategy.¹⁷

What analytic measures drove the Bottom-Up Review planners' efforts? It appears their measures of effectiveness may have been borrowed from Cold War era European planning. For example, the Bottom-Up Review accords a high priority to stopping or slowing the rate of advance of the aggressor force, and to developing the ground combat potential to reverse the aggression, by destroying enemy armored forces (reducing their armored division equivalents. In any event, given their importance in developing both concepts of military operations, and the forces to execute those operations, the Bottom-Up Review measures of effectiveness are too important to be excluded from the discussion of its recommendations.

Probability of Kill Values

Certain types of wargames require that probability of kill (Pk) values be given to systems or military formations. These values can exert a major influence on the outputs of wargames. What Pk values were employed in the gaming used for the Bottom-Up Review? For example, it would likely make a major difference in the games' outcomes if the Pk values for certain U.S. systems (like the Patriot air defense system and precision-guided munitions, for example) were those derived immediately after the Gulf War, as opposed to the revised (and considerably lower) Pk values that were determined after a more thorough assessment of the war.¹⁹

Scud Hunting and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The notional aggressor force described in the Bottom-Up Review includes some 100-1,000 Scud-class ballistic missiles, "some possibly with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons."²⁰ Since the Bottom-Up Review program will shape the U.S. defense posture well into the next decade, U.S. forces could encounter regional adversaries with ballistic missiles whose qualities were considerably better than those of the Scud. In addition, regional aggressors could well have significant numbers of cruise missiles. Although this threat is included in its MRC scenario, the Bottom-Up Review is unclear as to how U.S. forces would handle it.

The Bottom-Up Review operational concept calls for precision air strikes on key enemy targets during the initial response period to regional aggression. One would assume that a crucial element of these strikes would involve destroying the enemy's mobile missile systems and weapons of mass destruction. But early assessments of U.S. Air Force Scud-hunting operations were significantly more optimistic than those in a recently released comprehensive study commissioned by the Air Force

itself. The latter study showed the Air Force flew over 1,500 Scud strikes without scoring a single confirmed kill.¹² Results of strikes against the Iraqi nuclear program were also discouraging.¹³ If U.S. forces cannot neutralize the dangers from weapons of mass destruction, and the threat of missile attacks against friendly regional ports, airfields, and bases, it would profoundly change the manner in which U.S. forces were introduced into the region, as well as their number and composition.

The Bottom-Up Review states that, given short warning, U.S. forces should "deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as possible."¹⁴ This concept implies that the destruction of enemy missile and weapons of mass destruction assets must be accomplished rapidly. What forces will accomplish this task? The Bottom-Up Review states that U.S. forces would rely heavily on long-range bombers and land and sea-based strike aircraft using precision-guided munitions, and cruise missiles. Special operations forces would also be involved.¹⁵ But how will they do it? After all, these are the same types of systems that proved ineffective in this mission during the Gulf War. It seems likely that what will be required are major improvements in information assets so that U.S. strike systems know where these targets are located. What assumptions did the Bottom-Up Review wargamers make regarding Air Force "SCUD-busting" operations in gaming their scenarios? How did they deal with the need to disarm an enemy state's weapons of mass destruction inventory? If these weapons are not neutralized how will they effect Army ground forces?

Information Warfare

The ability of U.S. and coalition forces to win the information war during the Gulf War was one of the keys to their ability to defeat decisively the forces of Iraq. As U.S. forces develop the ability to

strike at great distances with high precision, information will become increasingly important. This fact is recognized by the military services, who are undertaking efforts to exploit the U.S. lead in information warfare as a means of retaining their current decisive lead in conventional military effectiveness over other military organizations. However, there is currently no wargame that does a satisfactory job of representing the dynamics of information warfare.

Thus it would appear that the models used to derive U.S. force requirements failed to take into account an increasingly important, if not potentially decisive, factor of war dynamics. This shortcoming presents two problems. First, by failing to consider an element where a major U.S. advantage exists, it may be that the force requirements for the MRC contingency are significantly overstated. Second, by this omission, those military systems and operations that are crucial to maintaining and extending the U.S., advantage in information warfare (as opposed to systems designed to maintain U.S. firepower advantages) may be discounted, leading to misplaced budget priorities.

The Personnel Factor

The United States military has a major advantage in skilled, trained personnel over nearly every other military organization in the world. The military services' substantial training budgets are but one indicator of the high priority placed on maintaining a high quality, well-trained force. The emphasis is well placed. Time and again, throughout history, military formations that were inferior in numbers and in equipment emerged victorious through superior leadership, personnel, and training. Yet oftentimes the wargames that are used to help develop force requirements ignore this important qualitative factor. It would be useful to know how the Bottom-Up Review planners

accounted for this major U.S. competitive advantage in deriving their force requirements.

Dollars and Sense

While the Bottom-Up Review force structure is clearly not affordable over the long term, it might be possible for the Administration to squeak by with the Bottom-Up Review plan over the next few years. Because the Defense Department is in the process of moving to a smaller force structure, and because it has procured large quantities of new equipment in the 1980s, Department of Defense can afford to underfund procurement in the short term. However, unless these additional cuts in procurement are coupled with plans to further cut the size of the Bottom-Up Review's force structure, they will only serve to compound the procurement shortfall Department of Defense will face in the out years. All reserve component units must be modernized to the same level as the active duty counterpart or the U.S. will run the risk of making the units incompatible and undeployable. Alternatively, the Administration could make deeper cuts in the R&D budget to cover its near-term underfunding problem. This would have even less of an immediate impact on the capability of U.S. forces. The long-term consequences of such a decision, however, could be far more detrimental than would be cuts in procurement.

Refusing to acknowledge the existence of a plans/funding mismatch in defense and attempting to execute the Bottom-Up Review-recommended defense program with the currently programmed budgets for defense involves accepting the greatest risk to U.S. security. The United States will find itself wasting scarce resources in a futile attempt to maintain military capability at the expense of its future military potential. The result could be a United States that finds

itself in the out years with both insufficient military capability, and the demands for undertaking another military buildup.

Conclusion of Bottom-Up Review

The Bottom-Up Review is as most things are, a sign of the times, it is as much a work of political doctrine as it is an analytical review of the Department of Defense from the bottom up. In the absence of clear strategic guidance from the White House, the Pentagon bureaucracy proceeded as any other bureaucracy, and tried to place a new world in an old environment. The other underlying sacred cow going into this review was, less money must be spent on defense and the savings should be applied to make the country a better place. The world has changed and this only means it is different, this did not make the strategic and military strategy of the country any easier or less costly to achieve. The preconceived notion that defense cuts could free up dollars to make the country a better place is a flawed notion and the United States must evaluate the world and what roles the U.S. wants to play. Then the U.S. can conduct a true bottom-up review that is not tied to a preconceived budget.

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CHAPTER 3

FORCE STRUCTURE AND STATUS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Background

The National Guard traces its heritage to the organization of the North, South, and East regiments in the Massachusetts Bay Colony on 13 December 1636. It has fought in every American war from the Pequot War of 1637 to Desert Storm.

At the end of the Revolutionary War, it was recognized that the militia had played an important role in winning the nation's independence. The authors of the Constitution empowered Congress to "provide for organizing, arming and disciplining state militia." However, recognizing the militia's state role, the Founding Fathers reserved the appointment of officers and training of the militia to the state.

The Army National Guard is comprised of fifty-four state and territorial forces of varying strength and unit composition. The current force structure plan reduces the Army National Guard to 405,000 force structure spaces out of which it will be allowed to fill no more than an end strength of 367,000 by fiscal year 1999.² The delta will be managed by lowering the percentage of spaces lower priority units are allowed to fill. The plan for this end strength is to have a force structure of eight divisions (four heavy divisions, one light infantry division and three medium divisions, consisting of one armored heavy brigade, one mechanized infantry heavy brigade and one infantry brigade), fifteen enhanced brigades, two strategic reserve brigades, and one scout group.

The concept of enhanced brigades was born from the fiscal year 1992 Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review. This study looked at ways the U.S. Armed Forces could meet their post-Cold War strategic

responsibilities at the lowest cost to the defense budget. The study reaffirmed the National Guard as the primary combat reserve for the active army.

The ARNG's Enhanced Brigades will be the Army's principal reserve component ground combat maneuver force. If needed, enhanced brigades are expected to reinforce, augment, and/or backfill active component units as required by the theater commander to which they are assigned.

The term "enhanced" refers to increased resource and manning priorities, with improved training strategies, to enable these brigades to deploy within 90 days after call up. These brigades will be employable, command and control-compatible, and logistically supportable by any U.S. Army corps or division.³

The Total Army must maintain flexibility and agility. The enhanced brigades are organized as seven light infantry brigades with each having three infantry battalions organized with air assault battalion Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), five mechanized infantry brigades (consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions and one tank battalion), two armored brigades (consisting of two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion), and a heavy armored cavalry regiment (ACR).

Composition And Force Structure

Total Force Policy

Total Force Policy can best be described as teamwork among all parts of the Department of Defense. The policy states that the Department of Defense will use all of its components to respond to operational missions or crisis. This includes the manpower resources comprising active and reserve military personnel, contractor staff, and host-nation personnel. This policy has improved the capability of the Department of Defense to expand rapidly to respond to operational missions, crisis, and national emergencies.⁴

Over the last decade, efforts made to strengthen the Reserve components have been very successful. The Reserve components are now full partners with the active components under the Total Force Policy

and have been integrated into all theater operational plans. Today most operations cannot be initiated without the use of the Reserve components.

Origin of U.S. Army Reserve Components

Department of the Army's two Reserve Component branches, the U.S. National Guard (state militia) and the U.S. Army Reserve, constitute over 50 percent of the total army force structure and personnel strength. (See table 1.) The history of Reserve forces supplementing the regular Army forces starts with Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution. This article empowered Congress to call out the militia of the states and to "provide for organizing, arming and disciplining" citizen soldiers.⁵

TABLE 1

FISCAL YEAR 1996 FORCE STRUCTURE ALLOCATION DISTRIBUTION

COMPONENT	COMBAT	CS	CSS	TDA	OTHER	TOTAL
AC	149,650	79,972	85,630	128,201	51,547	495,000
ARNG	221,791	67,279	91,775	36,532	2,260	419,637
USAR	14,686	33,193	93,964	70,576	17,581	230,000
TOTALS	386,127	180,444	271,369	235,309	71,388	1,144,637

Source: HQDA, U.S. Army Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) Data base, Force Lock, November 1995.

Reserve Component Off-Site Agreement

The "off-site" agreement is a major restructuring plan to help downsize, streamline (eliminate duplication of effort), and reshape both the U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. The agreement was drafted by senior leaders of the active army, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and members of the associations that represent the members of each component. This agreement was the first time that all the agencies of the total Army worked together to craft a major

restructuring initiative. The results of this agreement were released by the Secretary of Defense in December 1993.

The Army National Guard as mentioned earlier will be the Army's primary source within the Reserve components for combat force structure. The Army National Guard will also be a balanced force with combat support and combat service support force structure built into the eight divisions and the enhanced brigades. The U.S. Army Reserve will be the lead Reserve component supplying rapidly deploying combat support and combat service support force structure that the active components must have to deploy and sustain ground forces early on in a bare base theater.

Military Mobilization Manpower

The U.S. Army has the ability to expand its manpower to meet the requirements of a short-term operation, crisis or national emergency. The expansion is executed using the U.S. Army Reserve and the National Guard. All National Guard members are in the Ready Reserve.

The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National Guard (ING). Personnel are in organized units or train as individuals. All are subject to recall at time of war or national emergency.

The President may involuntarily order members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for any operational mission through the call-up authority prescribed in Section 673B, Title 10, United States Code.⁶

Without using this presidential power, the Department of Defense must depend upon volunteers from the National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve to meet short-term operational requirements.

State Use of the National Guard

The National Guard is a force that serves two masters. The President of the United States has call-up authority over the National Guard to support U.S. national security objectives and to support relief from national disasters and emergencies. The state governors have call-

up authority for statewide missions to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety. Some state missions that Guard units are frequently called upon to execute are riot control, firefighting, search and rescue, water transportation, and evacuation of disaster areas. The National Guard played a key role in the immediate response to Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Inicki, and the Los Angeles riots. State governors were capable of providing an immediate response to these situations using the National Guard.

Federal Use of the National Guard

The National Guard is not a federal component until federalized. When called up as a state militia, the National Guard can provide assistance to local law enforcement officers. The president can federalize the National Guard troops of any state before or after they have been called up by the state governor. When federalized, the Guardsmen can assist with restoring order and riot control, but may not act as a local police force because of restrictions placed on the federal Army by the Posse Comitatus Act. "Although Title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 3077-3079 authorizes federal recognition of Guard units, there is still a legal difference between them and federal units."

Today, five mobilization levels can be utilized to obtain access to the National Guard under Title 10, U.S. Code. National Guardsmen may, and are often asked to, volunteer their services to enter active duty in peacetime and during war or national emergencies. The level of the threat to national security determines the mobilization level. The five levels of mobilization are Selective, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, Partial Mobilization, Full Mobilization, and Total Mobilization.

- *Selective Mobilization* (10 USC 3500, 8500; 10 USC 331, 332; 10 USC 673). Congress or the President may order the expansion of the AC Armed Forces by mobilizing reserve units and/or individuals. This level of mobilization would not be used for a

contingency operation required to meet an external threat to national security, but rather a domestic threat to the safety and well-being of citizens. The 1992 Los Angeles riot is an example of this mobilization level.

- *Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up* (10 USC 673b). The President, by Executive Order, may augment the AC to meet operational requirements by calling to active duty up to 200,000 reserve personnel for up to 270 days. As indicated previously, this authority is known as the "200K call-up." The President is required to notify Congress and explain the reasons for his actions. President George Bush exercised this option after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
- *Partial Mobilization* (10 USC 673, 673b; 10 USC 6485). Congress or the President may declare a national emergency and issue an executive order for the augmentation of AC Armed Forces with up to one million soldiers (President only) as individuals or in units from the Ready Reserve for up to 24 months. Congress can pass legislation establishing any limit for a partial mobilization. Preparations for offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM required a partial mobilization after a Presidential declaration of a national emergency in January 1991 which was issued in order to freeze Iraqi assets in the United States.
- *Full Mobilization* (10 USC 671a, 672[a]). Congress is required to pass legislation, public law or joint resolution, declaring war or a national emergency. All reserve units and individuals within the force structure would be mobilized and authority is available for national conscription. An example of this level is the 1940 U.S. mobilization after the German conquest of France in the spring of that year.
- *Total Mobilization* (10 USC 671a, 672[a]). Congressional declaration of war or national emergency, public law or joint resolution, is required for this mobilization level. Not only are all reserve units and individuals called-up, but additional units are created beyond the force structure in existence, by national conscription if necessary. All the nation's resources are mobilized to sustain the expanded Armed Forces. World Wars I and II are examples of total mobilization.⁹

Resourcing the National Guard

The Reserve components are an integral part of the Department of Defense. They can provide much needed services to the total force in an appropriate amount of time at a fraction of the cost of an active unit. The citizen soldier provides a low-cost deterrent to conflict, an immediate response capability to domestic crises, and a surge mobilization capability.¹⁰

The four separate budget appropriations that fund the National Guard are: personnel, operations and maintenance, military construction, and equipment procurement. Here the thesis will address the personnel and operations and maintenance accounts. The military construction and the procurement account will be addressed later in the "Facilities and Equipment" paragraphs. The operations and maintenance account is used to fund the day-to-day operations of the Army National Guard Activities to include maintenance, air operations, school travel, and training. This account experienced a 3.4 percent increase from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1994 and had an total obligation authority of \$2,251.5 million after congressional increases. The personnel account funds provide for the pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, travel, bonus payments, and retired pay accrual cost of Army National Guard soldiers. This account experienced a 10 percent decrease from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1994 and had a total obligation authority of \$3,448.7 million after congressional increases. In fiscal year 1994 the Army National Guard experienced a shortfall in operation and maintenance funding, logistics support, air operating tempo, and school travel funds.¹²

Missions And Operations Other Than War

Contingency Missions

The National Guard enhanced brigades have a training strategy that will attempt to prepare these brigades for deployment ninety days after mobilization. Some enhanced brigades are scheduled primary players in major regional contingencies. The postmobilization training period for these units coincides with the Department of Defense ability to obtain transportation to get these units to the fight. If the situation for nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies were to arise, at least one-third of the enhanced brigades would be required as

part of the U.S. response. The effects of the shrinking active Army are already having an effect on National Guard missions, training and deployments. In 1994 the National Guard participated in many operational deployments, joint missions, and training exercises around the world. Some of these include:

- EUCOM: Support in the European theater was provided to RETROEUR, the Equipment maintenance operation in Central Europe. Military support was provided to the Southern European Task Force. Engineering support was provided for base closure and the maintenance of military facilities. During the fiscal year, 6176 soldiers deployed in support of operational missions in EUCOM.
- SOUTHCOM: Military police, medical, engineer, military intelligence, public affairs, and aviation support were provided. Over 9600 soldiers deployed to SOUTHCOM in support of operational and training missions.
- CENTCOM: Maintenance and signal support was provided. Over 1,800 soldiers deployed in support of CENTCOM.
- USACOM: Medical and engineering exercise and training missions were supported by 455 soldiers.

National Guard units are being deployed overseas to maintain U.S. commitments to strategic allies while reducing the OPTEMPO of the active forces. The ability to rapidly deploy National Guard combat units has increased while the active forces have been drawing down or right-sizing the U.S. Army. The National Guard has received practical experience and proven its ability to deploy overseas while conducting operational and training missions in support of the warfighting commanders in chief.

The Army National Guard combat forces are also vital to national security as they accomplish the following missions:

- Extended Crises. Where a large scale deployment requires forces to remain in place for extended periods, The Army National Guard can provide the basis for troop rotation.
- Peace Operations. Protracted commitments to peace operations could lower the overall readiness of active forces. To avoid decreased readiness, the Army National Guard along with Reserve forces, must be prepared to share the burden of conducting these operations.
- Deterrent Hedge. The Army National Guard divisions provide the base for an expanded force which serves as a deterrent to potential adversaries

- Domestic Missions. A substantial reserve must be available during both peace and war to support civil authorities in response to domestic requirements."

Theater Operations and Supporting Democracy

The Army National Guard became involved in the Joint Military-to-Military Contact program in June 1993. The program provides Eastern European countries non-lethal military training. The Army National Guard is also a role model of using military force subject to civil authority. In the European theater 6,100 Guardsmen supported the retrograde of equipment from U.S. Army Europe (RETROEUR) and the Southern European Task Force. Guardsmen from six of the eight National Guard divisions participated in this endeavor.

The Army's reliance on the Army National Guard for operational missions is best exemplified by the National Guard's participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) for the Sinai. This mission created a composite battalion with 83 Active, 401 Army Guardsmen, and 40 U.S. Army Reserve soldiers. This operation was completed using volunteer Reserve Component soldiers from 24 states.

Humanitarian Assistance and Domestic Operations

The Army National Guard deployed soldiers to conduct overseas humanitarian operations. This included constructing schools and performing an instructional Medical Readiness Training Exercise on the island of Barbados. Through the following programs, the National Guard, primarily the forces of Guard divisions, provides people with the values, self-esteem, skills, education, and self discipline needed to succeed.

- Starbase. Starbase is a program for youths 6 through 18 years of age, aimed at improving math and science knowledge and skills. The program starts at the elementary-school level to attract and prepare students at a young age for careers in engineering and other science-related fields.

- Civilian Youth Opportunities Program (ChalleNGe). ChalleNGe is a \$55.8 million, five-month in-residence program, with a one year post-residence mentoring component for youths 16 to 18 years old who are drug-free, unemployed high school drop-outs with no criminal record. The program goal is to significantly improve the life skills and employment potential of youth who cease to attend secondary school before graduating, through military-based training.
- Seaborne Conservation Corps. The Navy, Marine Corps, and the National Guard Bureau entered into a joint venture with Texas A & M University at Galveston and Americorps (part of the President's National Service program). The Seaborne Conservation Corps is based aboard a ship docked at Galveston, Texas, and is developed after the ChalleNGe program. The objective is to place 100 participants each cycle in the maritime field to receive on-the-job training.
- Youth Conservation Corps. The Youth Conservation Corps is a \$4.4 million six-week in-residence version of the ChalleNGe program, without the GED attainment component, conducted at National Guard installations.
- Urban Youth Corps. The Urban Youth Corps is a six-week non-resident version of the Youth Conservation Corps conducted at inner-city armories. The state currently participating in this program is California. Funding is \$600,000.
- Operation GUARDCARE. The fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the National Guard to continue this pilot program using National Guard medical personnel and equipment to provide health care in medically underserved communities in the United States.
- Operation CAREFORCE. Operation CAREFORCE is a pilot medical readiness training program developed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Civil-Military Directorate. The National Guard and Reserve medical communities developed a pilot program that provides readiness training for its members through supporting medically underserved communities of America.¹⁴

Counterdrug Operations

The National Guard Counterdrug Operation starts with a "Drug Abuse Resistance Education" (D.A.R.E.) and "Drug Education for Youth" program. Its first goal is aimed at reducing the drug demand and helping youth at risk. The D.A.R.E. program has reached more than 5,096,610 youths since its inception in 1994. It has evolved into 5,492 National Guard programs nationwide.

The Army National Guard is also at the forefront of drug interdiction operation.

The National Guard provided assistance to various law enforcement agencies, principally the U.S. Customs Service, resulting in the seizure of over 872,056 pounds of marijuana, 265,311 pounds of processed cocaine, 2,438 pounds of heroin, 694 pounds of opium, 308 pounds of hashish, 8,599 vehicles (includes air and water craft), 19,263 weapons, and \$236 million in cash. The National Guard supported operations that resulted in 96,599 arrests.¹⁷

Mission Summary

The combat divisions are vital to these operations as the enhanced brigades are training to increase their readiness and ability to perform contingency operations. If the enhanced brigades are to be able to accomplish their missions they must remain focused on warfighting skills in the limited training time that is afforded them. "The National Guard is structured and sized based solely upon federal mission requirements."¹⁶ The standards, organization of units, and funds for training and maintenance are established by the federal government. The National Guard is currently at the hub of domestic operation missions. Many of these missions are performed by the National Guard while serving on state active duty status or federally funded state duty status. Congress sponsors these programs, appropriates funds and then authorizes the release of funds as the state governors request to use the funds to participate in the programs to improve the quality of life within their state.

Training and Readiness

Readiness

Two of the most important aspects of the National Guard are the readiness of the force and what access to the force is available to the secretary of defense and the president of the United States.

Mobilization is a key aspect of readiness and training. Mobilization was previously mentioned in the last chapter under Federal Use of the

National Guard. Lower levels of defense spending and reduced force structure require efficient and effective change in the National Guard "to accomplish more with less."

Studies, such as the Bottom-Up Review and the Roles and Missions Study, have determined the best way to supplement the smaller active force, that is, to use Reserve Component brigade sized units with increased resource and manpower priorities. This concept of "enhanced brigades" was initiated from the fiscal year 1992 Bottom-Up Review. One of the methods the National Guard is using to attempt "to accomplish more with less" is tiered readiness. Tiered readiness is a concept of giving more resources to those forces that are to deploy first (enhanced brigades) and giving less to those who deploy later or not at all. This greatly affects the eight National Guard divisions because they are at the bottom of the tier and receive very little resources and without these resources their readiness continues to diminish. Reduced readiness leaves the divisions in a vulnerable position.

The Desert Shield/Storm failure to deploy National Guard combat roundout brigades highlighted the readiness issue of combat forces in the Reserve components. The roundout brigades were designed to be mobilized immediately and ready to deploy shortly after the active duty division that they supported. The close relationship between the National Guard roundout brigade and the active duty parent division had failed to produce a brigade for the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division, and the 1st Infantry Division. The responsibility for this not happening belongs to the active and Reserve components.

The Army implemented the following Title XI readiness initiatives during fiscal years 1992 through 1994. The four most critical programs implemented were:

- Mandatory Selected Reserve service for officers released from active duty service obligation.

- Active Component commanders will review officer unit vacancies and promotions.
- Create non-deployable account for Army National Guard (Army Reserve will implement similar account in Fiscal Year 1998).
- Readiness reporting system improvements.¹⁷

The early deploying of enhanced brigades and the Force Support Packages (FSP) units receives annual Operational Readiness Evaluations that assess their readiness. These units also receive an active component administered evaluation during their annual training period on their capabilities to meet a mission essential wartime task. The Army National Guard has an internal program that is designed to ensure that units are trained to a level of mobilization preparedness that is essential to support contingency plans and other national crisis situations. Ensuring that the units are capable of executing mobilization and deployment is the responsibility of the State Area Commands (STARCs).¹⁸

Simulators and Simulations

Readiness in the Army National Guard is being increased and maintained through the extended use of simulators. Simulations are being used at the individual, company, battalion, brigade and division level to increase readiness at reduced financial and environmental cost.

Simulations provide leaders effective training alternatives when maneuver and gunnery training opportunities are limited. When used properly, simulations can create the environment and stress of battle needed for effective command and battle staff training. Proper use of simulation helps commanders ensure quality battle training that can compensate for the following constraints to field training:

- Limited opportunities for field maneuver.
- Lack of a trained Opposing Force (OPFOR).
- Inability to replicate full logistics battle.¹⁹

Some of the simulator and simulations that are being used by National Guard units are:

1. Weaponeer is an individual rifle marksmanship trainer, which can be used inside the unit Armory or in its own mobile trailer.
2. Unit Conduct of Fire Trainers (UCOFTs) consists of tank and infantry fighting vehicle crew gunnery simulators, which are mounted on trailers and driven to armory sites.
3. Simulations Networking (SIMNET) occurs when Vehicle simulators linking combined arms tactical training by networks to accomplish maneuver training.
4. Guard Unit Armory Device Full-crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (GUARDFIST-I) permits an entire four man crew to conduct battle drills in armory and offers potential for increasing readiness at a relatively low cost.
5. GUARDFIST-II is a device for field artillery forward observer training which allows one-on-one training.
6. JANUS models maneuver, fire support, air defense artillery, aviation and engineer support. Resolution is to individual weapon systems. Up to 198 different systems can be defined and used to create up to 1,000 combat, combat support, or combat service support units.
7. Brigade Battalion Simulation (BBS) is a second generation system that will operate on Family of Simulation (FAMSIM)-compatible hardware. BBS adds the compatibility of being able to link to multiple sites for longer exercises.
8. Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is located at Fort Leavenworth and is designated to provide advance combat training opportunities through the medium of state-of-the-art automated battle simulations to battalion through corps commanders. The BCTP group also has a traveling team to visit National Guard units at their armories and provide the warfighting simulations.

Simulations are a major segment of the National Guard training strategy and will continue to play a key part in the readiness of National Guard units. Currently the National Guard gets many of its simulators from the active component. This is changing as the National Guard acquires simulators developed for their unique training situations including diversity of units and limited training time. The long-range goal is to provide the National Guard with simulations devices which are cost efficient and can be on hand at all training centers where the equipment is to be used. "Funding support for training simulators will be the critical link in maintaining maximum training readiness as the Defense budget continues to decline."²⁰

A significant portion of the improved training strategy of enhanced brigades is the use of simulations. Two enhanced brigades are currently participating in a "Simulations In Training for Advanced Readiness" (SIMITAR) test. The test involves the 48th Mechanized Brigade from Georgia and the 116th Armored Brigade from Idaho, Oregon, and Montana.

Through simulations, realistic and controllable battle experiences are delivered, on demand, to local armories and training areas-providing increased training opportunities, improved realism and timeliness of feedback to soldiers. The test objectives are to increase effectiveness of reserve component training by 200 to 300 percent; achieve the intensity of annual training during weekend training; and, ultimately, compress the equivalent of 90 days of post-mobilization training into 30 to 45 days. The two brigades are currently training with a variety of simulations and will each rotate through the National Training Center (NTC)-the 48th Brigade in fiscal year 1996 and the 116th Brigade in fiscal year 1997. It is hoped the NTC Rotations will be used to validate the SIMITAR training methodologies.

The Army National Guard is at the lead for the Department of Defense in Distance Learning. "By the application of multiple media and emerging technology, the National Guard is able to reconfigure and deliver portions of resident training to individual soldiers in the field."

This opens the door to training more soldiers in basic and advanced skills within their military occupational specialty (MOS). Soldiers will be able to get MOS training without having to leave their civilian

jobs from six weeks to one year to obtain new and/or additional training. The United States Army Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, has validated this technique. The Armor School transmitted a reconfigured advanced noncommissioned officer's advance course to Army National Guard soldiers via satellite, to videoteletraining sites in Montana, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. The Field Artillery School, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is currently coming on line with this technique for artillery men.

The OPTEMPO of the eight National Guard divisions has been reduced as the defense budget has been reduced. This reduction in OPTEMPO requires an increased use of simulators and training devices. The reserve component devices must be transportable to cover wider geographic regions (all active component tank and mechanized infantry battalions have their subordinate companies reside physically within a few hundred meters of each other, a comparable National Guard battalion may have the four line companies one hundred and thirty miles or more away from each other). With the reduced OPTEMPO these training devices, simulators and simulations are the only alternative way to train. Funding shortfalls over the past few years have been very detrimental to this program. Cascading training devices from deactivating Active Component units to National Guard battalions has stopped the system from totally collapsing. Funding shortfalls have reduced the delivery of the following types of simulators and training systems: Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Abrams Tank Unit Conduct of Fire Simulators; Artillery Engagement Skill Trainers (EST); GUARDFIST-I-for Armor; GUARDFIST-II-for the Field Artillery; and Armor Moving Target Carriers. The Army National Guard must receive equipment upgrades, system modernization, and product improvements to be successful on the battlefield.²³

The 34th Infantry Division of the Army National Guard is also using fiber optic networks to tie headquarters and armories together

within states. This will increase readiness and improve training opportunities by allowing shared access to information. The Army National Guard is taking advantage of today's technology to overcome the vast array of time and physical separation problems inherent with the way they conduct training.

Accessibility and Operational Missions

The Army National Guard throughout history has maintained its role as a key player in the nation's military strategy and continues to do so today. In the past five years the National Guard has deployed forces under volunteer status, Selective Mobilization, Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up, and Partial Mobilization. The Defense Department has successfully acquired access to the National Guard to support operational missions in Somalia, Haiti, Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) for the Sinai (MFO Sinai), and currently Operation Joint Endeavor. The need for Army National Guard assistance and supplementation of the active force has increased each year throughout the drawdown of active forces. The 82d Airborne Division and the 10th Mountain Division have repeatedly used volunteer Guardsmen from the 29th Light Infantry Division and the 42d Infantry Division. The active duty divisions have praised the Guardsmen sent to their unit.

The MFO Sinai mission monitors the 1979 peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. This mission has been performed for 13 years by some of the active army's most ready soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division. In January 1995 the Army formed a composite unit (4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment) of 401 National Guardsmen volunteers from 24 states, 40 United States Army Reservists and 83 active army soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division. This operation provided valuable overseas and combined operations training for the Guardsmen and reduced the active component's operations tempo.

A Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) was authorized for Operation Support/Uphold Democracy. There was a requirement for three ARNG military police companies. HQDA had stipulated that the use of volunteers be exhausted before soldiers were involuntarily called. The three military police companies were mobilized with all volunteers using the Humanitarian Support portion of the Volunteer Unit Program. "The volunteer unit programs enhance accessibility by identifying individuals/units for voluntary active duty in support of either contingency, humanitarian, or peacekeeping missions."¹⁴ These companies were used to provide back fill support for active installations that deployed their military policemen to Haiti. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) requested volunteers for potential fills of individual requirements. The State Area commands responded with over one thousand three hundred volunteer names. Through their support of MFO Sinai and Operation Support/Uphold Democracy the ARNG has proved that it can execute operations other than war. With dwindling resources and increased operations tempo the Department of the Army must remain capable of using the Total Army force structure to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy. The ARNG has improved readiness and volunteer accessibility to meet these obligations. Capabilities of improving accessibility through Department of Defense involuntary call up of units and selected individuals remains an issue with DOD, the President and the U.S. Congress.¹⁵

Professional Military Education

The Army National Guard Professional Military Education (PME) program is defined as all formal schooling subsequent to basic and advanced individual training conducted at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) certified training institutions or equivalent institutions of the other services. ARNG PME requirements mirror those of the active

component. Completion of PME requirements commensurate with the grade is considered necessary for advancement. PME requirements can be met by going on active duty for training, correspondence courses, attending reserve component schools, or a combination of these activities.

The National Guard divisions must have leaders who have attended the appropriate level courses for the positions they hold. Tiered readiness and funding is becoming a major drawback to getting these officers and NCO's educated for the divisions. Reserve component schools often teach a TRADOC approved modified version of the active component course. Courses at the reserve component schools are often taught at times so that the student can continue training with his unit and not be absent from the student's civilian job. Congress believes that improving the PME taught at reserve component schools and making it more accessible to all reservists will improve reserve component readiness.

The Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a test program to improve the provision for professional military education to Reserve component officers of the Army by assigning such officers to an Army Reserve Forces school in an inactive duty status to attend professional education courses.²⁶

Equipment

The equipment posture of the Army National Guard in the early 1980's was destitute. The lack of overall equipment readiness and equipment on hand for the ARNG made the Total Force concept a paper tiger within the Department of the Army. Little or no equipment improvement had occurred since the Vietnam Conflict. The new equipment that was being procured was fielded to the active force only. The ARNG receives the preponderance of their equipment from Department of the Army procurements. The ARNG units were not crucial participants in any of the contingency plans. One of the attributes of not using the ARNG

in contingency plans was a lack of equipment readiness and quantities of equipment on hand.

Congress and the Department of Defense had placed considerable emphasis on equipping the reserve components in a first to deploy/employ, first to be equipped priority system. The policy was documented in Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces. This along with the roundout concept changed the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). The list sequences units in the order that they are to deploy for contingency operations.

The roundout brigades were assigned as the third brigade of an active division and were to deploy with these divisions during contingencies. The roundout policy created a substantial change in the way the Army conducted business. The new equipment training and delivery of the M-1 Abrams tank to the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi Army National Guard, roundout to 1st Cavalry Division prior to some active divisions, was an example of the implementation of the Total Force policy. The Total Force policy was now being executed within the equipment distribution system. Reserve component equipment posture was being improved, but multiple years of neglect would seemingly take decades to fix. Congress decided that the reserve components should receive direct procurement funds dedicated to improving their readiness.

Additionally, Congress augmented Reserve component acquisitions with funding specifically designated for the Reserve components identified as National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA). Congressional intent has been for National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriations to complement Service appropriations to improve training and readiness.

The Army National Guard has procured approximately 2.4 billion dollars of equipment from fiscal year 1989 through fiscal year 1995 using NGREA funds, significantly reducing equipment shortages and increasing equipment readiness and quantities on hand. This equipment also

increases the compatibility between the ARNG units and their active counterparts. Fiscal Years 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 procurement with NGREA funds are shown in table below. The reserve components need more dollars each year and the budget is decreasing. This will constrain readiness due to equipment on hand and reduce the training efficiency of some units.

TABLE 2
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATIONS
(Dollars in Millions)

	1993	1994	1995	1996
Army National Guard	399	194	121	100

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1995), 71.

Equipment Modernization and Conversions

The Army National Guard continues to modernize its cargo helicopter inventory with the addition of twenty-three CH-47D helicopters. Aviation improvements included the addition of nine OH-58C helicopters while turning in older OH-6A observation helicopters. The utility fleet received twenty-one UH-60A Blackhawk helicopters. The ARNG combat force increased its capabilities with thirty-five M-1A1 Abrams tanks, and seventy-two M-2/3 Bradley fighting vehicles. Other modernization items included significant quantities of modern high mobility medium wheeled vehicles, night vision goggles, and speech secured equipment. All M-60A3 tanks are due to be replaced by Abrams tanks by the end of FY98.

The ARNG is currently undergoing several major equipment conversions to maintain capability with the active component. All M-113s armor personnel carriers will be converted to the M-113A3 configuration. This configuration is capable of operating on the

battlefield with the Abrams main battle tank. All combat vehicles will replace the VRC-12-46 series radios to the new single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINGARS). The 45 caliber pistol is being replaced by the new 9 millimeter Beretta. Two ARNG field artillery battalions converted from M-110 howitzers to the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). In FY96, the ARNG will field the new M-1020 mortar carrier with 120 millimeter mortar to replace the M-106A1 carrier with 81 millimeter mortar. The M-9 armored combat earth movers (ACE) will replace some D-7 dozers, other D-7 dozers will be upgraded to an F model that is ninety percent compatible with the top of the line G model. The Air Defense Artillery will stand up Avenger systems to replace the phased out Chapperal system. Lastly, thousands of night vision devices have been purchased to further modernize and enhance readiness.

Most of these modernizations and conversions are possible because of the drawdown of active forces. This has increased the modernization pace of the ARNG by four times the pre-drawdown rate. The equipment that is being cascaded from inactivating active units is increasing compatibility with the active forces and making the ARNG more lethal, survivable, reliable, maintainable, safe and mission capable. The ARNG will continue to have equipment shortages of the following items:

- Medium Tactical Trucks
- M113A3 Armored Personnel Carriers
- NBC Equipment
- Observation Helicopters
- Radio Communications Equipment
- Heavy Tactical Trucks
- M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles
- Utility Helicopters
- Modernized Attack Helicopters
- Security Communications Equipment

Other equipment shortfalls are a growing unfunded depot maintenance requirement that was \$36,000 at the end of FY 93, and had risen to

\$144,900 by the end of FY 95. With the shrinking defense budget, the ARNG depot maintenance backlog continues to grow.

Facilities

The terms modernization and conversion in the military are often associated with equipment. These terms must be carried further to include real property. Army units cannot convert from the M-60A3 tank to the M-1 Abrams tank, or modernize from the fifty-eight ton M-1 Abrams tank to the sixty-two ton M-1A1 Abrams heavy tank without adjusting the current maintenance or training facilities. This real property predicament exist for all National Guard divisions. Without this lead time there is no money budgeted to modernize or convert the maintenance facilities or the gunnery training ranges. The cascading of equipment continues and many ARNG sites are dilapidated and incompatible with the equipment the site is hosting. This detracts from the readiness of the eight National Guard divisions.

There are insufficient operational funds to maintain and operate all Army National Guard major training areas. This has a significant negative impact on readiness and training. Failure to act on this issue will directly impact the ability of the Army National Guard to perform its mission.

Poor facilities and supporting infrastructure degrade mission readiness and lower morale. The Army National Guard FY94 Construction (MILCON) backlog/unfunded requirements totaled more than \$3 billion, representing nearly 2,000 construction projects. The backlog continues to grow because of equipment modernization, unit reorganizations, and the aging of existing facilities.

Maximum use of existing facilities, leasing facilities, and temporary facilities are steps that have been taken to continue to

accomplish the Army National Guard mission as it waits for new construction, expansion, or modernization of existing facilities.

The Army National Guard uses facilities and installations of other Services through inter-service agreements, usually at no cost. As these installations, bases, and facilities are closed, support must be obtained from other installations and support agencies. This often results in increased travel costs, travel time, and additional personnel costs.

The Eight National Guard Divisions

Federal Mission

The eight National Guard divisions until 1991 had a wartime trace mission assigned to join U.S. corps on the battlefield after the completion of postmobilization training. The divisions no longer have a federal mission assigning them to a higher headquarters or specifically telling them to what theater they would likely deploy. The enhanced brigades now have the title of the Army's primary combat reserve. The generic federal mission used by the divisions is:

Maintain a state of operational readiness, enabling the division to mobilize, deploy to a sector, zone or area of operation and fight as a follow-on force of a corps, to be assigned, in a theater of operation. The division may also deploy to conduct operations other than war to include federal disaster emergency assistance.¹²

State Mission

The state missions of the National Guard have not changed. There have been some questions as to whether the states will have enough resources available to react to state contingencies if the eight National Guard divisions are deactivated. Past studies show the utilization rate of the National Guard for state contingencies to prove that there would be enough Guard structure if the divisions were inactivated. The current state mission used by all of the states and territories in some form is:

On order of the governor or other competent authority mobilize, and deploy to provide for assistance in the restoration and/or preservation of peace, order and public safety. On order provide Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) in coordination with state and federal agencies."

Common Training and Manning Strategies

Former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan established the following training directives to improve readiness in the reserve components. Infantry and Armor units will spend their weekend drill and annual training time exclusively on individual, crew and platoon level skills and collective task. Combat support and combat service support units train at the company/battery level. The brigades and battalions train using the Brigade Battalion Simulation (BBS) and the battalions through divisions train using the Battle Command Training Program. During annual training platoons concentrate on gunnery and maneuver using lane models.


The divisions are spread across the country from New York to California and as far north as Minnesota and south to Texas. Some divisions have units in as many as seven states (see Figure 3.) The Division authorized to fill eighty-five percent of their required personnel and fifty percent of their full-time manning personnel. The divisions are currently not funded for any exercises due to the tiered levels of readiness and fund allocations that have been established.

The 28th Infantry Division Keystone Division

The 28th Infantry Division has its headquarters at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. The division is organized as a mechanized Infantry Division and has four tank battalions, and five mechanized infantry battalions. The division's major pieces of equipment include the M1 Abrams Tank, the M113 series Armor Personnel Carrier, the AH1 Cobra series attack helicopter, Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Communications system, and the M109 series 155 millimeter howitzer.

FIGURE 3

THE EIGHT NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS



Source: HQDA, DAMO-FDG, "National Guard Force Structure Brief", Washington, DC, May 1995, Slide 2.

The entire division is spread across the state of Pennsylvania with the exception of one armor battalion, and one assault helicopter company in West Virginia, and an engineer brigade headquarters at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia.

The division will start providing training support to two enhanced brigades, the 30th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) and the 218th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), in fiscal year 1997. The division will be tasked with providing dedicated OPFOR (opposing forces) and higher headquarters support during field and simulation training.

During the Cold War the division was designated to deploy to Europe as a member of the XVIII Airborne Corps.³³ The 28th Infantry division has a long and distinguished history.

During the Battle of the Bulge from December 16 to 20, 1944 the 28th Division stymied Hitler's advance, allowing General Dwight D. Eisenhower to rush the 101st Airborne Division to Bastogne. The 28th had bought the time needed to block German advances. The resistance offered by the Keystone troops was one of the greatest feats ever performed in the history of the American Army.

The division was formed in 1878 to improve the training and readiness of Pennsylvania's citizen soldiers. The 28th became the first U.S. Army division formed--predating the regular divisions by 38 years.

The division first traveled to foreign fields in 1917 as part of General John J. Pershing's American Expeditionary Force (AEF). While in France, the 28th served a record 135 days in combat and suffered the second highest casualty rate of any unit in the AEF.

Already activated when the Japanese bombed Pearl harbor, the 28th stepped up the pace of training and deployed to England in October 1943. Shortly after the famous 6 June 1944, D-Day assault, the 28th was in France again, entering combat, 22 July 1944. The division spent that summer participating in the bloody battles that eventually liberated

Paris. After leading the victory parade through the City of Lights the 28th fought in the European campaign's fiercest battles, remaining in action until Victory in Europe (VE)-Day. During World War II the 28th division earned five campaign streamers, in addition to the Croix de Guerre.

The division had an even shorter rest after World War II, because President Harry S. Truman activated the 28th in 1950 for the Korean War, and sent it on its third trip to Europe to become part of America's commitment to NATO forces in Germany thereby freeing up active component members for service in Korea.³¹

29th Infantry Division (Light)

The 29th Infantry Division has its headquarters at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. The Division is organized as a light infantry division and has nine light infantry maneuver battalions. The division's major pieces of equipment are the Tube Launch Optically Tracked Weapon System (TOW), 120 millimeter mortars, 81 millimeter mortars, 105 millimeter towed howitzers and the AH1 Cobra series attack helicopter. The division is spread out over five states to include: Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. The division currently provides OPFOR and higher headquarters support for the 53d Infantry Brigade (Light), an enhanced brigade from Florida.

During the Cold War the 29th maintained an affiliation with the XVIII Airborne Corps and continues to provide assistance in the form of filler personnel and deployment assistance.³² The division has a distinguished history that dates back to the Civil War.

Organized in July 1917, the 29th originally included Guard units from Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware and the District of Columbia. Many of the division's units fought against one another during the Civil War, and in honor of this service--and to symbolize the

brotherhood of North and South--that the division was nicknamed The Blue and Gray Division.

The 29th traveled to France during World War I in July 1918 and entered combat in October, fighting until 11 November 1918. The 29th Infantry Division was mobilized in January 1941 and reorganized with units from Maryland and Virginia only. Already in service when Congress declared war, the division sailed for England in October 1942. The division formed a ranger battalion that trained under the British commandos and participated in several of the Englishmen's daring raids. On 6 June 1944 the division gained eternal fame when its soldiers were part of the initial assault on the beaches of Normandy. After D-Day, the division took part in the bloody battles that liberated France. The division then drove into the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr, and eventually linked up with the Russians on the Elbe river. The 29th earned five Presidential unit Citations and had two Medal of Honor recipients while participating in the Allied victory in World War II.

In 1968, despite its long and distinguished record, the 29th was deactivated. In October, 1985, the 29th became the only light division in the National Guard and has since proven its value to the Total Force. During Operation Desert Storm, division support elements prepared the 82d Airborne Division for its rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia. The 29th made history again in 1995 when its members formed most of the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the Desert Panthers, and took up duties as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) contingent.

Most recently, the Blue and Grey patch could be seen at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, where two battalions of the division's 115th and 175th Infantry Regiments prepared soldiers for deployment to Bosnia.³³

34th Infantry Division (Red Bull)

The Red Bull division has its headquarters in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The 34th division is soon to be spread out over the following seven states: Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Illinois, Michigan and Colorado. The division is organized as a medium division and has one infantry brigade consisting of three air assault battalions, a mechanized infantry heavy brigade consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions and one tank battalion, and an armor heavy brigade consisting of two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion. The division's major pieces of equipment are the M1 Abrams tank, M113 series armor personnel carrier, the AH1 Cobra attack helicopter, the M109 155 millimeter howitzer, the M119A1 105 millimeter towed howitzer, and the TOW missile launcher. The division will develop a training relationship with two enhanced brigades, the 116th Armored Brigade from Idaho and the 39th Infantry Brigade (light) from Arkansas. The division will act as a higher headquarters and provide dedicated OPFOR for these enhanced brigades.

During the Cold War the 34th Infantry Division was affiliated with the V Corps in Germany, and its wartime mission was to return to Europe. The 34th was organized in the summer of 1917 from National Guard units in Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, and the Dakotas as America geared up for World War I. Although the division was broken up and became a replacement formation during that war, its men performed magnificently in a variety of units.

In October 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt called up the National Guard for a year. The 34th entered federal service in February 1941. Soon after America's entry into World War II, the division was alerted for shipment overseas and set sail for the United Kingdom on 14 January 1942. The 34th went overseas less than a year after being inducted into Federal service.

While stationed in the United Kingdom, Captain William Darby, a divisional staff officer, established the famous 1st Ranger Battalion--the predecessor of today's Ranger Forces. After landing, the division was involved in the struggle to free North Africa. Following the bloody battles of the Rapido River and Monte Cassino, the division took part in the Anzio landings. Among those in the 34th's ranks during the landings was Sargeant John W. Vessey, a future chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The division continued fighting through Italy, being one of the first units into Rome. During the 34th Infantry Division's five campaigns, it had served a total of 317 days in combat--more than any other division in the American Army. Forty-six months after leaving the United States, the division returned home.

Reorganized in 1946 as a National Guard division, the 34th served in its state capacity until 1968, when it was deactivated. In 1991, because of the division's fearsome combat reputation, the decision was made to reactivate the 34th as a medium infantry division. In the short time that the division has been a component of the total force, it has proved that it is ready and able to live up to its past accomplishments.

35th Infantry Division (Sante Fe Division)

The 35th Infantry Division's headquarters is at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The division will soon complete its transition to the medium division structure. The division will be spread out over seven states to include: Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Illinois, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Delaware. The maneuver elements of the division are one infantry brigade consisting of three air assault battalions, a mechanized infantry heavy brigade consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions and one tank battalion and an armor heavy brigade consisting of two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion. The

division's major pieces of equipment are the M1 Abrams tank, M113 series armor personnel carrier, the AH1 Cobra attack helicopter, the M109 155 millimeter howitzer, the M119A1 105 millimeter-towed howitzer, and the TOW missile launcher.

The division currently supports the training of three enhanced brigades, the 41st Light Infantry Brigade from Oregon, the 116th Armored Brigade from Oregon, and the 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from Georgia. The 35th provides higher headquarters support and OPFOR during simulation exercises. The division will also provide units to be a dedicated OPFOR for the 41st and the 45th Light Infantry Brigade out of Oklahoma during maneuver training.

The 35th held a Cold War mission that would have returned the division to Europe as a member of the V Corps. The division has recently provided individual volunteer soldiers to serve with the Implementation Forces in Bosnia. The 35th Santa Fe Division was formed on 18 July 1917 from Kansas and Missouri National Guard units for service in World War I. The division left the United States in April 1918 and was on the front lines by June. The commander of Battery D, 129th Field Artillery, Missouri National Guard, was future U.S. President, Captain Harry S. Truman. During the course of the operation, the division suffered appalling casualties in the battle of Exermont. During 110 days on the line, the 35th had suffered 7,296 casualties. Following World War I, the unit was inactivated.

In September 1935 the 35th was reactivated. This time the division was comprised of units from Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. In December 1940, the 35th was called into federal service. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 35th was rushed to the West Coast where it prepared for a possible Japanese invasion. However, it was sent to Europe in May 1944. The 35th landed at Omaha beach on 5 July 1944 and was soon involved in the bloodiest fighting in the hedgerow

country around the important town of St. Lo. The division suffered more than 2,000 casualties during its operations around St. Lo. Following the capture of St. Lo, the 35th Division was part of the drive across France. After the liberation of France, the division was involved in the remaining campaigns to liberate the rest of Europe. During the "Battle of the Bulge," as the offensive became known, the 35th was one of the first units to relieve the 101st Airborne Division. During its ten months of combat, the division had fought with three different armies in five major campaigns, earned six presidential unit citations and suffered 14,473 casualties.

The 35th was reorganized as a National Guard division in 1947 and continued to serve in this capacity until it was disbanded in 1963. In 1984, the division was reactivated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, using the same divisional flag that had been used when the division was activated for World War II, as the 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized), with elements of the Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, Colorado and Kentucky Army National Guard.

38th Infantry Division (Cyclone Division)

The Cyclone Division has its headquarters in Indianapolis, Indiana. The division will soon complete its transition to the medium division structure. The division will be spread out over three states to include: Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. The maneuver elements of the division are one infantry brigade consisting of three air assault battalions, a mechanized infantry heavy brigade consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions and one tank battalion, and an armor heavy brigade consisting of two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion. The division's major pieces of equipment are the M1 Abrams tank, M113 series armor personnel carrier, the AH1 Cobra attack

helicopter, the M109 155 millimeter howitzer, the M119A1 105 millimeter towed howitzer, and the TOW missile launcher.

The division will soon support the training of the 76th Infantry Brigade (Light) in Indiana. The 38th will provide higher headquarters support and OPFOR during simulation exercises. The division will also provide units to be a dedicated OPFOR for the 76th Infantry Brigade during maneuver training.

The 38th held a Cold War mission that would have returned the division to Europe as a member of the VII Corps. The division has recently provided support to units in Haiti and prepares to provide support to the 100th anniversary of the Olympics Games in Atlanta. The near future for the 38th is as sunny as its history was stormy.³⁴

The 38th Infantry Division was organized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in 1917. The camp was hit by a cyclone and the canvas community proved to be no match for mother nature. The Guardsmen of the 38th took this storm as a sign of what they would soon be doing to the Germans and nicknamed their unit the Cyclone Division. However, the 38th would not have an opportunity to wreak havoc on the Germans as a division. In October 1918, the division was stripped of its personnel to replace combat losses being suffered in other divisions.

Called up for a year's active duty in 1940, the division's members knew after the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, that they would not be home for Christmas. For the next forty-seven months, the 38th trained and provided cadres of personnel to other units. The 38th's first test as a division in combat came in December 1944 when it landed at Leyte in the Philippines. Following the liberation of Leyte, the division participated in the battles that led to the liberation of Luzon and the fulfillment of General MacArthur's famous promise, "I will return." From the time of its arrival in the Pacific Theatre in 1944 until the Japanese surrender in 1945, the division fought in three

campaigns and accounted for 26,732 Japanese casualties. The 38th was instrumental in the liberation of the Philippines and earned a Presidential Unit Citation from the Republic of the Philippines.

After distinguished service during World War II, the 38th was reorganized as a National Guard unit in 1948. The division was organized as an all Hoosier division and remained so until 1967 when units from Michigan and Ohio could be seen proudly wearing the famous 38th insignia.

During the Cold War, the Cyclone could be found all over the world. The 38th conducted training and real world missions in Europe, Central America, and the Caribbean that consistently demonstrated its ability to successfully conduct its mission. The 38th was affiliated with the VII Corps and trained to fight on the plains of Central Europe.

The future for the 38th promises to be just as busy as the past has been. This summer the division will be in Atlanta, Georgia, providing support during the 100th anniversary Olympiad.

40th Infantry Division (Sunshine Division)

The Sunshine Division has its headquarters in Los Alamitos, California. The division is soon to be organized as an armored division and have five tank battalions and four mechanized infantry battalions. The division's major pieces of equipment include the M1 Abrams tank, the M113 series armor personnel carrier, the AH1 Cobra series attack helicopter, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) communications system, and the M109 series 155 millimeter Howitzer. The division is soon to be spread across the state of California, with other units in Arizona, and Montana. The division's armor units are transitioning to the M-1 Abrams tank through fiscal year 1999. The transition is being extended due to a lack of funds available to repair the tanks that are coming from active units that have upgraded to the 120 millimeter Abrams tank. The

division will start providing training support to two enhanced brigades, the 29th Infantry Brigade (Light) and the 41st Infantry Brigade (Light) in fiscal year 1997. The division will be tasked with providing dedicated OPFOR and higher headquarters support during field and simulation training.

During the Cold War the division was designated to deploy to Korea as a member of I Corps. The 40th has a distinguished history. The Sunshine Division was activated on 18 July 1917 in the National Guard as Headquarters, 40th Division and organized with troops from Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. The division was not deployed to World War I and remained at Camp Kearny, California until it was inactivated on 20 April 1919.

The division was reactivated and federally recognized, with soldiers from California, Utah, and Nevada, on 18 June 1926 in the California National Guard at Berkeley. The division entered federal service on 3 March 1941 at Los Angeles and was reorganized and redesignated 18 February 1942 as Headquarters, 40th Division. The division then deployed to the Pacific theater and entered combat on Guadalcanal in December of 1943. The division gallantly fought at Bismarck Archipelago, the South Philippines, and participated in the assault landing at Luzon. Following the war the division returned to California and reverted to state control on 7 April 1946 at Camp Stoneman, California.

The Second Brigade of the 40th Infantry Division has a long and distinguished history that dates back to 1881 and saw service at St. Mihiel and on the Meuse-Argonne line during World War I. In 1954 the division was reorganized as an armored brigade and was later reorganized and redesignated on 13 January 1974 as Headquarters, 40th Infantry Division.³⁵

42d Infantry Division (Rainbow Division)

The Rainbow Division has its headquarters in Troy, New York. The division is organized as an armored division and has five tank battalions and four mechanized infantry battalions. The division is spread out over eight states: New York, Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Delaware, and New Mexico. The division's major pieces of equipment include: the M1 Abrams tank, the M113 series armor personnel carrier, the AH1 Cobra series attack helicopter, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) communications system, and the M109 series 155 millimeter Howitzer. The division continues to affiliate and work with III Corps. Recently the division has supported the 10th Mountain Division with individual volunteer filler soldiers for its many deployments and is seeking to be the next National Guard unit to rotate through the MFO-Sinai peacekeeping mission. The division will start providing training support to two enhanced brigades, the 27th Infantry Brigade (Light) in fiscal year 1997. The division will be tasked with providing OPFOR and higher headquarters support during field and simulation training.

During the Cold War the division was designated to deploy to Europe as a member of the III Corps. The division history includes participation in both World Wars. Former General of the Army Mac Arthur was a member of the 42d Infantry Division. The 42d Infantry Division was constituted 14 August 1917 in the National Guard as Headquarters, 42nd Division. Organized 5 September 1917 at Camp Mills, New York. The division deployed to Europe and fought courageously in the following campaigns: Champagne-Marne, Aisne-Marne, St Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Champagne 1918, and Lorraine 1918. The division returned to the United States following the war where it was returned to state control on 9 May 1919 at Camp Dix, New Jersey.

Reconstituted 5 February 1943 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters, 42d Infantry Division. The unit was federally activated on 14 July 1943 at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma. The division trained for and was shipped to Europe where it participated in the following World War II campaigns: Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, and Central Europe. The division was in Austria at the end of the war and inactivated 29 June 1946 in Austria. The 42d was reorganized and federally recognized 31 March 1947 in the New York National Guard.

49th Armored Division (Lone Star)

The Lone Star Division has its headquarters in Austin, Texas. The division is organized with five tank battalions and four mechanized infantry battalions. The division's major pieces of equipment include the M1 Abrams tank, the M113 series armor personnel carrier, the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, the AH1 Cobra series attack helicopter, the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) Communications system, and the M109 series 155 millimeter Howitzer.

The division is spread across the state of Texas and has an Air Defense Artillery Battalion in North Carolina. The division maintains an affiliation with III Corps and participates in corps level exercises. The division's armor units are transitioning to the M1A1 Abrams (120 millimeter main gun as compared to the 105 millimeter main gun on the M-1 tank) tank through fiscal year 2000. The 120 millimeter main gun will make the division's tanks compatible with all active forces. The transition is being extended due to a lack of funds available to repair the tanks that are coming from active units that have deactivated. The 49th Armored Division is the most modernized National Guard division. In fiscal year 1996 the division will field the 120 millimeter mortar, palletized load system (PLS) truck transportation, mine clearing line charges, the initial fire support automation system upgrade, and

transition additional infantry battalions to the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle.

The division is participating in the military support to civilian authorities program by providing medical care to parts of the state that do not have adequate resources and the adopt a school program. The division will start providing training support to two enhanced brigades, the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Louisiana and the 155th Armored Brigade from Mississippi in fiscal year 1997. The division will be tasked with providing dedicated OPFOR and higher headquarters support during field and simulation training.

During the Cold War the division was designated to deploy to Europe with the III Corps. The 49th is a proud and strong division. Organized 4 June 1917 in the Texas National Guard at Houston as Headquarters, 1st Brigade. Drafted into federal service 5 August 1917 and redesignated as Headquarters, 72d Infantry Brigade, an element of the 36th Infantry Division. The brigade deployed to Europe and participated in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. The brigade was demobilized on 20 June 1919. The brigade was reorganized and federally recognized in the Texas National Guard on 8 November 1922 as, Headquarters, 72d Infantry Brigade, an element of the 36th Infantry Division. The unit was federally mobilized in 1940. The brigade did not deploy overseas and was disbanded on 10 February 1942. Three years later the headquarters was reactivated as the 49th Armored Division in the Texas National Guard. The division was federalized a few other times but did not deploy to a theater of war.

The 1st Brigade, 49th Armored Division participated in seven World War II Campaigns as 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry of the 36th Infantry Division. Thus the division has campaign participation credit in both world wars.

The National Guard Force Structure in the Future

The only thing that is certain for the National Guard of the future is, it will play a large part in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America. The allocation of billets in the National Guard are not excess. The force structure of the eight divisions is excess because it is not properly aligned with the current war plans and national military strategy of the U.S. The U.S. must look beyond the state and federal politics, the sentimental and historical aspects, and properly align the force structure currently within the eight divisions. If the force structure remains allocated as it presently is, it will come under constant attack for being excess. The U.S. must then assign valid missions that are justifiable within the national military strategy. to all elements of the force structure. There are valid uses for the force structure found in the eight National Guard divisions. These uses will benefit the state and territorial governments and the federal government. The Defense Department cannot waste this asset and must move to properly align this force structure so that it can be a contributor to the national security strategy and the national military strategy.

Endnotes

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³Ibid.

⁴John O. Marsh, Jr., U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1994), 2.

⁵Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1, 1994), 3.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Keller, 10.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Marsh, 5.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., 30.

¹⁵Ibid., 32.

¹⁶Roger Allen Brown, William Federochko, Jr., and John F. Schank, Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1995) 22.

¹⁷Ibid., 68.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹U.S. Army War College, 21-29.

²⁰Marsh, 75.

²¹MG John R. D'Araujo Jr., "Army National Guard: A Vision for the Future," Army 1995-96 Green Book, October 1995, 15.

²²Marsh, 75.

²³Ibid., 76.

²⁴D'Araujo, 39.

²⁵Marsh, 64.

²⁶Marsh, 82.

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²⁸Roger Allen Brown, Assessing the State, 9.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Major Barry Reynolds, Deputy G-3, 28th ID(M), interview by author, telephone, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, 30 April 1996.

³¹Christopher Anderson, "The 28th Infantry "Keystone" Division," National Guard, January 1996, 19.

³²Major Virgil Gray, Deputy G-3, 29th ID (L), interview by author, telephone, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 30 April 1996.

³³Christopher Anderson, "29th Infantry Division (Light)," National Guard, February 1996, 19.

³⁴Christopher Anderson, "38th Infantry Division," National Guard, May 1996, 18.

³⁵40th Infantry Division received Campaign Participation Credit from World War I, World War II and the Korean War.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF ARNG CAPABILITY TO PERFORM STATE AND NATIONAL MISSIONS, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR AT HOME AND ABROAD

Can the eight National Guard divisions perform their current federal missions?

A major question that must be analyzed when reevaluating the force structure of the eight National Guard divisions is, Can these units accomplish their assigned missions? The analysis of this question is divided into these secondary level questions which must be answered first:

1. What are the federal missions currently assigned?
2. Are the federal missions currently assigned valid?
3. Are the divisions trained to accomplish the currently assigned federal missions?
4. Are the divisions equipped to accomplish the currently assigned federal missions?
5. Are the divisions capable of mobilizing and deploying to accomplish their federal missions?
6. How many National Guard combat divisions, if any, are required to accomplish these mission?

These questions will be answered using the results of Government Accounting Office studies and reports and reviewing the Defense Planning Guidance, RAND reports and studies, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army briefings and reports, Forces Command briefings and reports, and the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.

What are the federal missions currently assigned?

The Guard's eight combat divisions (above and beyond the fifteen enhanced brigades) are not required to accomplish the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency strategy, according to Army war planners and war planning documents that were reviewed. These documents include the Bottom-Up Review, Defense Planning Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and briefing slides of Department of the Army and Forces Command war planners. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not assigned missions to these divisions in any major regional conflict currently envisioned in Department of Defense planning scenarios. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made all fifteen enhanced brigades available for war planning purposes, the planners have identified requirements for less than ten brigades to achieve mission success in a war.² The additional enhanced brigades not identified in war planning requirements are a deterrent hedge and forces that can be used when the enemy is achieving unsuspected success. These forces must be mobilized early if the U.S. is to have them available as reserve forces to protect against unsuspected enemy success.

The purpose of reserve combat forces and some uses stated in the Bottom-Up Review include:

1. Deploy to an MRC if operations do not go as planned.
2. Provide the basis for rotation when forces are required to remain in place over an extended period after the enemy invasion has been deterred.
3. Backfill for overseas forces further deployed to an MRC.
4. Serve as a strategic/deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes.
5. Provide support for civil authorities at home.²

According to an Army official who participated in the review, there was no analysis to determine the appropriate number of forces required to perform these missions. The review does not allow the reader to fully determine whether these missions are to be executed using the enhanced brigades or the eight National Guard divisions and three strategic

reserve brigades. The Department of Defense sponsored Commission on Roles and Missions acknowledged these missions as implied tasks for the enhanced brigades that were not initially deployed to the theater.

According to Department of Defense documents and Department of the Army officials, the eight National Guard divisions are a strategic reserve. The only federal role that is implicitly assigned to the eight National Guard combat divisions is that of a strategic/deterrent hedge. There are no direct stated missions for these divisions at this time. These missions are not specified in the current war plans or planning scenarios. The strategic/deterrent hedge mission does not exist in any Department of Defense planning scenarios or war plans.

The Bottom-Up Review was very specific in listing the above the line forces to remain in the U.S. Force Structure for 1999.³ The table below is extracted from the Bottom-Up Review and the eight divisions of the National Guard are not shown. Of particular note is the entire above the line force structure to include Reserve component forces listed for each of the other services. The BUR planners did not plan on the eight Guard divisions being in the 1999 force structure. The defense strategy and force structure option that was selected by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin is option three (win two nearly simultaneous MRCs), this option listed the Army combat, above the line forces, as ten Active divisions and fifteen Reserve enhanced brigades (fifteen Reserve enhanced brigades are five division equivalents.)⁴

In addition, the force structure provides sufficient capabilities for strategic deterrence and defense. It also provides enough forces, primarily reserve component, to be held in strategic reserve and utilized if and when needed. For example, reserve forces could deploy to one or both MRCs, if operations do not go as we had planned. Alternatively, they could be used to backfill for overseas forces redeployed to an MRC.⁵

Thus the Bottom-Up Review identifies the portion of the fifteen enhanced brigades that are not assigned direct missions in support of a combatant

TABLE 3

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE-1999

ARMY	10 Divisions (active) 5+ Divisions (reserve)
NAVY	11 Aircraft Carriers (active) 1 Aircraft Carrier (reserve/training) 45-55 Attack Submarines
Air Force	346 Ships 13 Fighter Wings (active) 7 Fighter Wings (reserve) Up to 184 Bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)
Marine Corps	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 personnel (active end-strength) 42,000 personnel (reserve end-strength)
Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)	18 Ballistic Missile Sumbarines Up to 92 B-52H Bombers 20 B-2 Bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)

Source: Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993), 1.

commander as the strategic/deterrent hedge. The eight National Guard divisions are not assigned any federal missions in accordance with the Bottom-Up Review.

Joint staff officials who participated in the review fully intended on the divisions being deactivated from the force structure. The intentions to deactivate the divisions were considered to be a possible political upheaval that could detract from the other results of the review. The findings of the review were not altered but this potential sticking point was never addressed in the press conferences or text of the review. As mentioned earlier no analyses were completed to determine the proper size combat forces needed above the fifteen enhanced brigades. The fifteen enhanced brigades are not fully engaged during a two nearly simultaneous major regional conflict scenario. The

nonengaged brigades could provide the United States with a strategic/deterrent hedge and provide military support to civilian authorities.

This study has determined that the mission of conducting/ facilitating postmobilization training for the enhanced brigades is critical and best executed by the National Guard divisions. This is a valid mission because the active components could man one of four possible sites for a heavy brigade and one site for the light brigades. All other active forces would not be available to conduct this training because of deployment to the theater, pending deployment, training to maintain readiness or support of other deployed forces. The divisions handling these missions would also serve as a strategic/deterrent hedge.

Are the federal missions currently assigned valid?

No, the Bottom-Up Review did not specifically assign any missions or responsibilities to the eight National Guard divisions. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces identified the combat divisions as excess and suggested that the force structure be utilized, converted to other uses, or eliminated. The Department of Defense has replied to a Government Accounting Office report on Army National Guard division force structure with the following:

The eight National Guard combat divisions may or may not be directly employed in combat roles in the possibility of a two major regional conflict scenario. Those divisions are, however, expected to perform missions, such as rotational forces for extended crises (including those involving one or more MRC's) and assisting active forces in protracted peace operations. The divisions also provide a hedge that could form the basis of an expanded American force structure and serve as a deterrent to future adversarial regimes, plus providing capability to meet domestic crises.⁶

The documents that were reviewed provided no analytical basis for this level (force structure) of strategic/deterrent hedge.⁷ This thesis has determined that a valid mission is that of facilitating the training and support of the enhanced brigades as they prepare to conduct and become

proficient at company, battalion, and brigade combat operations. United States Army Forces Command sponsored a study by the RAND organization to determine the postmobilization training resources requirement for the eight heavy enhanced brigades (this includes the 278th Armor Cavalry Regiment).⁸

The seven light enhanced brigades face a similar challenge with their postmobilization training. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, has an active duty observer/controller staff, post infrastructure that can conduct mobilization training for one light brigade at a time. The National Guard has one light infantry division that could set up mobilization training for a second light brigade and provide the personnel resources.

The current heavy brigade training model is designed for a 102-day train-up period. A train-up model for the light forces has not been approved, but JRTC trainers believe between 80 and 100 days should suffice for getting the light brigades up to standard and deployed to the theater. The BUR states these forces must be deployable ninety days after mobilization. The best means for accomplishing this task and minimizing turbulence throughout the rest of the Army is to use National Guard divisions to accomplish this mission. The divisions assigned this mission would also provide strategic insurance and support civil authorities. The federal missions implied in the BUR, occupational forces, rotation forces, and backfill for overseas forces further deployed to an MRC, are valid missions that are within national security interest.⁹ Further studies are needed to determine if the fifteen enhanced brigades need the assistance of the National Guard divisions to accomplish these missions.

Are the divisions trained to accomplish the currently assigned federal missions?

The eight National Guard divisions are not assigned a specified federal mission. The divisions are fully capable of providing postmobilization training support, OPFOR, and installation support and infrastructure to assist in getting the enhanced brigades trained to standards at the brigade collective level and shipped to the required theater. There are not enough active forces to prepare for one MRC, maintain readiness to deter another, answer that second MRC if deterrence fails, and prepare the enhanced brigades for war. The National Guard divisions have proven that they are capable of doing this by deploying two light battalions from the 29th Infantry Division to Hohenfels, Germany, to assist with Active and Reserves forces pre-deployment training for implementation force (I-FOR) duty in the Balkans. The divisions should be assigned the missions of conducting enhanced brigade postmobilization training and deploying them to theaters of operations.

The divisions are being paired with enhanced brigades to assist with the sustainment training of the enhanced brigades during weekend drills and annual training. The divisions will provide opposing forces (OPFOR), and portray higher headquarters during simulations and field exercises.

Are the divisions equipped to accomplish the currently assigned federal missions?

Yes, although the National Guard divisions do not currently have a federal mission. The divisions are adequately equipped and this is improving each year with the active duty drawdown and the current RETRO-EUR program. The majority of the National Guard Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) dollars are designated for the needs of the enhanced brigades. The divisions will complete the retirement of the M60A3 tank

fleet in 1998. The divisions are improving their equipment on hand status in all lines of equipment from radios to rolling stock. With the equipment on hand the divisions are capable today of assuming the mission of providing postmobilization training support, OPFOR, and installation support for the enhanced brigades at selected training sites. Fielding of the SINCGARS radio can improve the interoperability between the enhanced brigades and the divisions. Communications are not broken but could be improved.

Are the divisions capable of mobilizing and deploying to accomplish their federal missions?

Yes, the National Guard divisions are very capable of mobilizing and deploying. These divisions do not currently have a federal mission that requires them to mobilize or deploy. The mobilization capabilities are exercised in most units of the division twice a year along with the preparation for overseas movement (POM). The POM process is an administrative, legal, financial, medical, dental and other areas as required check to see if the Guardsmen are prepared to depart on an overseas deployment. The divisions would be very capable of deploying to training sites to provide postmobilization training OPFOR and installation support for the enhanced brigades.

How many national guard combat divisions, if any, are required to accomplish these missions

None, there are no federal missions currently assigned to divisions of the National Guard. The potential mission for the National Guard divisions of providing postmobilization training support, OPFOR and installation support for the enhanced brigades will require four National Guard divisions, three heavy and one light. One division would be required to operate each of the four enhanced brigade training sites. Each division will be required to provide an installation support package of over 1,700 soldiers (see table 4) an OPFOR package of

approximately 5,200 soldiers and a training support package of 330 soldiers.¹¹

The division supporting the enhanced brigade's postmobilization training would be activated at 85 percent strength and would deploy over one-half of its strength to support the training. The division is not tasked to fill the enhanced brigades shortages but would more than likely fill out the brigade because it is the most effective way to get the brigade to 100 percent of authorizations. This would leave a brigade-sized plus unit in each division's state area to provide military support to the local civilian authorities if needed. With the enhanced brigades deploying and the divisions supporting their training, this would leave few National Guardsmen to perform their state and federally funded missions. Cooperative agreements would be very important for ensuring total coverage of state missions and rapid reaction to natural disasters. Each division would continue to recruit to fill its own ranks.

The mission of providing support for the postmobilization training of the enhanced brigades is in direct support of the national military strategy. This mission would require three heavy or medium divisions and the one light division.

Can the eight National Guard combat divisions
perform their current state missions?

What Are The State Missions Currently Assigned?

The state mission of the National Guard divisions is to provide units trained and equipped to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety under the order of state and federal officials.¹¹ The National Guard has a wide range of state missions. These missions include the defense of states or other entities from disorder, rebellion, or invasion; emergency and disaster relief; humanitarian assistance; and community support activities.

Table 4

INSTALLATION SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

TYPE	UNIT	# PERSONNEL
AG	AG Company	129
	Finance Company	64
	PA Detachment	5
Medical	Medical Detachment	151
	Sanitation Detachment	10
	Dental Detachment	23
	Air Ambulance Company	130
MP	Criminal Investigation Detachment	11
	Combat Support Company (MP)	177
Supply	Combat Support Company (QM)	134
Transportation	Light/Medium Truck Company	117
	Movement Control Detachment	7
Ordnance	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	17
Maintenance	Non-Divisional Maintenance	235
	GS Maintenance	218
	ATE Repair Detachment	7
Signal	MSE Battalion (2 nodes)	280
Total		1735

Source: RAND, Report Number DB-154-A, Postmobilization Training Resources: A briefing for the FORSCOM Command Readiness Program, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, August 1995), 6.

In crisis situations, the governors primarily use the Guard to supplement civil agencies after those agencies have exhausted their resources. According to Guard officials at the state level, the state expects the local authorities to respond first, followed by county, and then state resources. If the crisis exceeds the state's civil capabilities, the Guard can be called on for added support. For example, needs far exceeded the state's civil agencies' capabilities after Hurricane Andrew devastated south Florida. Therefore, the governor called up almost 50 percent of Florida's Army and Air Guard personnel for such tasks as providing temporary shelters, removing debris, distributing food and water, and providing security.

For situations beyond the state's capabilities, the governor can ask the president to declare a federal emergency. When this declaration is made, The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) becomes the coordinating agency between state and federal agencies. For example, Florida's immediate assistance needs after Hurricane Andrew exceeded the capacity of the state's resources, including its Guard forces. As a result, the governor requested and received a presidential disaster declaration that entitled the state to obtain federal funding and assistance from the FEMA, other federal agencies, and the active military.

The federal government has added several domestic initiatives to the Guard's federally funded state missions. For example, newly acquired initiatives include drug interdiction and counterdrug activities, drug demand reduction programs, medical assistance in underserved areas, and the Civilian Youth Opportunities program. Although federally funded, the state governors authorize missions like these under the control of authorized Guard officials.

In the previously mentioned study, which was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, RAND reported that the Army and Air Guard in fiscal year 1993 experienced the highest number of state active duty days in over ten years. The fifty-four state and territorial Guard entities reported spending over 460,000 duty days on state missions, involving over 34,000 members of the total Guard. This equated to about 6 percent of the total available Army and Air Guard personnel. Almost 50 percent of the Guard's use that year was due to the Midwest floods.

As might be expected, Guard usage for state missions varies from state to state and year to year. For example, RAND reported that elements of the Florida Army and Air National Guard were on state active duty in 1992 for Hurricane Andrew for over eighty days, with a peak

personnel commitment of some 6,200 out of a total strength of about 13,500, or about 46 percent. RAND also reported that New York, with an Army and Air Guard strength of about 20,000, had its highest Guard usage in six years in 1994. During that year, the state used about 6,000 Guard workdays, which amount to about one state active duty day per year for about 30 percent of the state's total Army and Air Guard strength. The Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, fiscal year 1994 authenticates these numbers and provides a list by state of the deployment and employment of National Guard soldiers by mandays and the maximum number of Guardsmen deployed on any one day.

RAND reported that, nationally, state demands on the Army and Air Guard are not significant. Moreover, the Guard's own data does not show sizable demands on its personnel and resources for state missions. As such, RAND concluded that, even in a peak use year, state missions would not require a large portion of the Guard and should not be used as a basis for sizing the Guard force. It also concluded that the Guard is large enough to handle both state and federal missions, even in the unlikely, but possible, event of simultaneous peak demands.¹²

Are the state missions currently assigned valid?

Yes, the generic state mission (described above) is all encompassing and remains valid. The governor of a state has the right to use the National Guard as he sees fit to protect life and property and preserve the peace of the state. All states and territories use the Guard as a last resort after they have exhausted local, county, and state responses.¹³ The president of the United States has the power to federalize national Guard troops of all states and territories and change the mission given to them by the governor if he deems it necessary.

Are the divisions trained to accomplish the currently assigned state missions within the time needed?

Yes, Guard officials at the state level have commented that general soldier skills, such as discipline and following a chain of command, are often all that are needed to satisfy state missions. In the specialized skills areas, this study determined that support skills and equipment, such as engineering, transportation, medical support, aviation, and military police, are most often needed. During this study Guard officials in California, Florida, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and Virginia were interviewed by telephone. Many comments from these interviews were common amongst the states. Guard members are asked to perform a variety of tasks on state active duty. For example, the guard provided homeless shelters, prepared food, and delivered water for people displaced by natural disasters. The Guard patrolled the streets of cities during riots and after natural disasters to reestablish order and maintain peace. The Guard provided support to firefighters during wild fires. In most midwestern states with rivers running through them, the Guard was tasked to fill sandbags to fight flooding during fiscal year 1994.

All Guard units receive training on a yearly basis on conducting operations to restore and maintain the peace. In a state status the Guard soldiers can provide law enforcement assistance and make an arrest.¹⁴ Once federalized, the Posse Comitatus Act restricts Guardsmen from enforcing the laws of a state or territory.

Are the divisions equipped to accomplish the currently assigned state missions?

Yes, it is important to note that equipment and facilities required to support missions performed by the National Guard are determined by the same organization and unit tables as the Active Component. The table of organization and equipment (TOE) has been

standardized.¹⁵ The National Guard divisions have some documented shortages in their equipment on hand. These shortages minimally detract from their state missions due to their ability to get temporary use of any equipment required but not on hand from other units that were not called up. Often the equipment that is deployed to a site is left there and used by the other units rotating to the state call-up mission. The states usually have a cache of riot protection gear and other equipment and supplies that are compatible to National Guard usage for conducting restoration or maintenance of the peace assistance to law enforcement agencies. There are also two national storage sites of civil disturbance equipment (CDE) to support the National Guard operations plans for military support to civil authorities (MSCA).¹⁶

Are the divisions capable of mobilizing and deploying
to accomplish their state missions?

Yes, the divisions are capable of mobilizing and deploying to respond to the states call. All states and territories have extensive plans for the guard divisions' units upon state mobilization. These plans are usually generated by the state area command (STARC). Recent state mobilizations and deployments have shown that the units called up have been leaning forward and were able to respond almost instantaneously. Due to the fact that the missions usually require limited or no specialty training, the STARC will usually call up the unit closest to where the support is needed.

Given the concerns for potential hardships to guard members, their families, and their employers, most state Guard leaders plan to rotate guard members used in state missions lasting longer than seven days. For example, in both the Midwest floods of 1993 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Guard personnel were rotated which resulted in the use of a greater number of personnel, but for a shorter duration.

Are there critical force structure deficiencies identified in Total Army Analysis (TAA) 03 that are currently confronting the total army?

What type of units are identified as being shortages for the total Army by taa-03?

The types of units identified by TAA-03¹⁷ as being shortages for the Total Army force structure are broken down into two categories. They are combat support units (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Units identified as shortages by TAA-03 (see Table 5) are often put into the Army's Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) database in what is known as Compo Four.¹⁸ These units are valid requirements of the Total Army that cannot be resourced with personnel, operating funds, and/or equipment.

Combat support units provide fire support and operational assistance to combat forces. These units include air defense artillery (ADA), field artillery (FA), chemical (CM), engineer (EN), military intelligence (MI), military police (MP), and signal (SC).¹⁹ TAA-03 has identified unit shortages in the following branches: air defense artillery, chemical, engineer, and signal. The shortage units are at echelons above division (EAD).²⁰

TABLE 5

UNITS IDENTIFIED AS SHORTAGES IN TAA-03

Adjutant General Replacement DET	Quartermaster Air Drop Companies
Explosive Ordnance Detachments	Quartermaster Pipeline Companies
Light Medium Truck Companies	Quartermaster POL Supply Companies
Medical Battalions	Quartermaster POL Supply Detachments
Medical Holding Companies	Quartermaster Subsistence Ration PLTs
Medium Cargo Truck Companies	Staff Judge Advocate Senior Military Teams
Medium POL Truck Companies	Staff Judge Advocate Trial Defense Teams
Palletized Load System Truck Co	

Source: HQDA, Total Army Analysis-03 Message, December 1995.

Combat service support units provide assistance (primarily logistical and administrative) to sustain combat forces. These units include administrative, chaplain services, civil affairs,²¹ food

services, finance, legal services, maintenance, medical services, supply, transportation, and other logistical services.²²

CS and CSS units are: (1) divisional support units, which are part of active and National Guard combat divisions provide support to divisional units, and (2) nondivisional support units, which are separate units in the active component, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve that support divisional and nondivisional units.²³ The numbers and types of divisional support units are determined by Army doctrine. For example, all divisions are doctrinally required to have one military police company to provide security and law enforcement. For nondivisional support, the Army determines the numbers and types of units that are required for its total combat force through a biennial process, referred to as the Total Army Analysis. The Army then identifies, based on weighing priorities, the units that will be allocated resources--personnel and equipment. In July 1994, the Army began the Total Army Analysis (TAA-03) process to determine nondivisional support requirements for the bottom-up review force. TAA-03 has identified unit shortages in Table 5.

Army Had Difficulty Providing Support During the Persian Gulf War

During the Persian Gulf War, a single regional conflict, the Army deployed virtually all of some types of nondivisional support units and ran out of some other types of units, even though it deployed only a portion of its total active combat force, about eight of eighteen divisions.²⁴ The specific types of units affected included: (1) quartermaster units, such as water, graves registration, and pipeline and terminal operation companies; (2) transportation units, such as heavy and medium truck companies; and (3) military police units, such as companies that handle enemy prisoners of war.

The Department of Defense, for several reasons, was able to mitigate the potential adverse impact of shortfalls, for example: (1) U.S. forces had a long lead time to deploy before conducting a counteroffensive against Iraqi forces and the counteroffensive was of short duration; (2) Saudi Arabia provided extensive host nation support, such as transportation and water; and (3) no second conflict developed at the same time requiring a U.S. response. In a two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency situation, the Army may face even greater challenges than it encountered during the Gulf War. As envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review, the Army, with little warning, may need to simultaneously support at least ten active divisions deployed to two major conflicts in two different regions.

Army Lacks Units to Support Total Combat Force and Specific Regional Conflict Plans

The Army does not have sufficient nondivisional support units to support the current force. Based on its most recent Total Army Analysis, the Army decided not to allocate resources to 674 nondivisional units required to support the two nearly simultaneous MRC warfight. Although these 674 units are a small portion of the total nondivisional support requirement, they represent important capabilities required to support combat operations.

Army Has the Option of Using National Guard Divisions to Augment Nondivisional Support Capability

The eight Army National Guard divisions that the Department of Defense does not envision using during a two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency situation contain support units. The Army has compared the capability in support units in a typical National Guard division with the capability reflected in nondivisional support units that were not allocated resources during the recently completed Total Army Analysis-03.¹⁸

Are there shortage units identified by the TAA that would provide military assets (trained personnel and equipment) to assist The governors in accomplishing state missions?

Yes, of the above listed shortage units many of the skills and assets these units have are in great demand to a state during a natural disaster or civil disturbance. Explosive Ordnance Detachments (EOD) can provide bomb detection, removal, and destruction teams. Truck Companies can be used to move supplies to needed points. Engineer units can provide debris removal, civil construction, and specialized fire-fighting capabilities. Signal units can provide emergency communication networks. Medical Battalions and Holding Companies can provide doctors, nurses, temporary hospitals, and medical support for natural disasters and civil disturbances. Air Drop companies can rig supplies to be dropped to fire fighters of wild fires. Subsistence ration platoons can store and distribute food during natural disasters. These are just some of the specialized capabilities these units can bring to a state or territory to support a governor.

Can some units under the current divisional force structure be Converted to TAA-03 shortage units and retain military Occupational specialties (MOSs) and equipment?

Yes, each division contains several support units that are functionally similar or identical to nondivisional support units that were not allocated resources during the 1993 Total Army Analysis. This study compared the TAA-03 shortage units with the capabilities found in the eight National Guard division force structure. The comparisons showed that these divisions also have many of the same types of skilled personnel and equipment that the nondivisional support units have. In checking the Army tables of organization and equipment of the eight National Guard divisions it was noted that the personnel and equipment assigned to these divisions have many of the same skilled personnel and equipment needed for nondivisional support units. For example, these

divisions could provide 100 percent of the unresourced nondivisional support requirements for: (1) 321 types of skilled personnel, including helicopter pilots, communications technicians, repair personnel, military police officers, intelligence analysts, and petroleum and water treatment specialists; and (2) 407 types of equipment, including medium trucks, trailers, tractors, generator sets, chemical and biological masks, radio sets and antennas, and water supply and purification systems.

By using units, personnel, and equipment from the eight divisions, the Army could create additional nondivisional support units or augment existing ones and reduce the TAA-03 shortage of nondivisional support units.¹⁶

Endnotes

¹The actual numbers of enhanced brigades required is a classified number.

²General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD Report Number 96-63, Army National Guard-Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Side Those Forces Accordingly (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, March 14, 1996), 3.

³Above the line forces are the Army divisions and the subordinate units that make up the divisions. It is a term used to describe the forces that fight wars and their first line support units.

⁴Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993), 30.

⁵Aspin, 29.

⁶General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD Report Number 95-80, FORCE STRUCTURE: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability Department of Defense Comments, (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, March 1995), 17.

⁷General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD Report Number 96-63, 2.

⁸RAND, Report Number DB-154-A, Postmobilization Training Resources: A briefing for the FORSCOM Command Readiness Program, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, August 1995), 6.

⁹Aspin, 94.

¹⁰RAND, Post Mob Tng, 16.

¹¹John R. D'Araujo, U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, FY 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), vi.

¹²Roger Allen Brown, William Federochko, Jr., and John F. Schank, Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1995), xxi.

¹³Roger Allen Brown, xvi-xvii.

¹⁴National Guardsmen do not usually make arrest they often accompany trained civilian law enforcement officials.

¹⁵Roger Allen Brown, William Federochko, Jr., and John F. Schank, Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1995), xvi-xvii.

¹⁶These sites are located near C-130 airstrips in the low-threat environment areas of Guernsey, WY and Fort Indiantown Gap, PA.

¹⁷This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the simulation of combat to generate nondivisional support requirements, based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.

²¹The product of the TAA and POM process is the approved force structure for the Total Army which has been divided for resource management purposes into components, Compo One units, Component, U.S. Army, are the active duty forces, Compo Two units are the Component, National Guard forces and Compo Three units are Component, U.S. Army Reserve, Compo Four units are deliberately unresourced so that resources may be applied to higher priority structure.

²²U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1, 1-16.

²³TAA-03 ARSTRUC MESSAGE.

²⁴Civil Affairs is listed in FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, October 1985, as a combat service support. Special Operations command is currently requesting that civil affairs be addressed as a maneuver asset. In many planning circles civil affairs are currently addressed as a combat support element and meets the definition in FM 101-5-1 as a combat support element.

²⁵U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1, 1-16.

²⁶Indivisional support units supplement divisional support units and also provide unique types of support, such as constructing facilities or providing specialized medical care.

²⁷General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-67 Operation Desert Storm: Army had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accounting Office, 10 Mar , 1992), 8.

²⁸General Accounting Office, FORCE STRUCTURE: Army National Guard Divisions, 7.

²⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Background

The Department of Defense selected the two nearly simultaneous conflict strategy and determined the combat forces capable of executing the strategy. For the Army, these forces consisted of ten active divisions and fifteen Army National Guard enhanced readiness combat brigades.

The Department of Defense also provided for other National Guard combat forces, now organized as eight divisions, that it does not envision using in a two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency situation. These forces are also called upon to meet domestic dangers, such as natural disasters and civil unrest.

This has led to many congressional and Department of Defense inquiries as to the cogent requirement for the eight National Guard divisions in the force structure. The inquiries to date have produced multiple conclusions. A couple are: (1) The divisions are excess, eliminate them from the force structure. (2) There is a strategic/deterrent hedge that is needed. The size of this hedge or if the hedge is provided within the enhanced brigades has not been determined. (3) The divisions should be converted into combat support and combat service support force structure to make up for current warfighting deficiencies identified in TAA-03.

This study has determined that the latter suggestion is an appropriate use for some of the force structure of the National Guard divisions. This use would be in alignment with the current National

Military Strategy and the findings of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces." In addition to this use this study as determined that there is a valid need for the National Guard divisions to provide support for the enhanced brigades to complete their postmobilization collective training and deploy to the required theater of operations.

Recommendations

Fix the Combat Support/Combat Service Support Force Structure Deficiency

Total Army Analysis-03, completed in early fiscal year 1996 projects a shortage of 60,000 combat support and combat service support troops, primarily in transportation and quartermaster units. One of the final recommendations of TAA-03 is to resource some of this force structure (See Table 6). These units are needed to repair equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide services, and otherwise sustain combat operations. TAA-03 did not have a program to decrement and could not resource this force structure. Part one of the recommendations of this study is to resource the CS and CSS shortages by converting the force structure in four of the eight National Guard divisions.

To execute a conversion of this nature will require considerable planning by the National Guard Bureau and Headquarters, Department of the Army. Conversions of this magnitude (see Table 6) will take twelve to fifteen years once the plan has been approved and initiated. Equipment will be the long pole of the tent in this plan. The U.S. Army must therefore start here. The planning must start with the identification of equipment assets required by CS/CSS units to be created. These requirements must be balanced with the equipment assets on hand from the four National Guard divisions and those available

elsewhere in the Department of the Army. Programs will need to be established to purchase the equipment assets that remain unavailable. Effective dates of unit conversions and activations of new units can then be established in accordance with the unit being able to receive enough equipment and trained personnel to effectively accomplish their assigned mission.

Personnel must be matched between unit military occupational skill requirements and the training and experience of the individual soldier. Those skill positions that are not filled by previously trained personnel must be filled by retraining a soldier from an excess MOS or recruiting and training a new soldier. Distance learning courses and contract courses could help to ease this turbulence. Military schooling should be planned well in advance to make maximum utilization of scheduled courses and afford the Guardsmen a chance to get trained in their new MOS prior to the effective date of their new or converted unit.

Four National Guard heavy or medium divisions manned at 85 percent would have a force structure strength of 55,000 billets. To buy the TAA-03 CS/CSS force structure recommended by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), would cost 45,826 force structure billets (see Table 6). This would leave 9,174 available to be used elsewhere. National Guard personnel commonly addressed the low level (50 percent) of authorized full-time manning personnel as one of the detriments that reduces their readiness. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces concurred with the recommendation to increase full time support. The 9,174 spaces should be used to buy back 1,529 authorized full time manning spaces.

TABLE 6

TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS-03 RECOMMENDED FORCE STRUCTURE BUY LIST

Unit	Quantity	Strength	AGG Strength
Firefighting Platoon HQ	24	4	96
Firefighting Team v1	27	2	54
Firefighting Team v2	27	6	162
Med Bn	3	343	1,029
Med Holding Co	2	241	482
EOD Team	2	5	10
EOD Team	2	7	14
EOD Team	4	4	16
QM HHD POL SUPPLY	34	55	1,870
QM Co POL SUPPLY	66	194	12,804
QM Co Airdrop	1	173	173
QM Plt Perish	2	56	112
QM Co Corps Coll	1	221	221
QM Co Mortuary Affairs	1	181	181
Qm Tm Laundry	14	15	210
QM Co Laundry	10	123	1,230
QM Co Pipeline	4	168	672
SC Cable/Wire Co	3	208	624
SC Signal Co	1	140	140
SC Tritac Contig Co	1	119	119
SC Cbt Camera Co	1	78	78
SC Power Pac3 Co	2	155	310
AG HHD Repl Bn	1	40	40
ADA HHB AADCOM	2	355	710
ADA Avenger Bn	2	408	816
ADA BN AADCOM	2	990	1,980
ADA Co ADA Spt	1	177	177
ADA BN Contingency Spt	1	463	463
AIR GRND LNO TM HQ DET	7	2	14
HQ EAC LNO TM	87	2	174
SJA Tm Trial DEF	8	5	40
SJA Tm Sr Mil	4	2	8
TRANS Co Lt Mdm	2	164	328
TRANS CO Mdm POL 7k	36	172	6,192
TRANS CO Mdm POL 5k	37	174	6,438
TRANS CO Mdm CGO	24	183	4,392
TRANS CO PLS	6	142	852
TRANS CO HET	3	303	909
CHEM Co NBC Recon	1	140	140
CHEM Co Bio Detection	2	197	394
FA BN	2	575	1,150
TOTAL			45,826

Source: HQDA, Total Army Analysis-03 Message, December 1995.

Provide for the Postmobilization Training
of the Enhanced Brigades

The second half of the recommendations of this study centers around having forces available to provide postmobilization for the enhanced brigades. It has been designated that the enhanced brigades will be the Army's principle Reserve Component ground combat maneuver force.² These brigades are tasked to deploy within ninety days after call-up. The training strategy for the brigades are to maintain proficiency at the crew and platoon level and to complete their collective training for company through brigade level after mobilization. This requires large training sites to conduct brigade level collective training.

The postmobilization training model for the enhanced brigades requires 102 days: twelve days to mobilize, prepare for overseas movement (POM), and move to the training site; and ninety days to conduct postmobilization training up to the brigade collective level.³ Training sites for four heavy enhanced brigades and two light enhanced brigades would be sufficient for meeting dates the units are required in theater and that shipping is available to get forces into theater.

The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, are fully functional and resourced site that can be used during the postmobilization training of the enhanced brigades. The other three sites selected were: Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Bliss, Texas; and Fort Carson, Colorado with Pinion Canyon.⁴ One site could also be established at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, in addition to the JRTC at Fort Polk to train the light brigades. This would establish two sites to train the light brigades and four sites to train the heavy brigades.

These sites must be equipped with installation support, trainers, training support personnel, and a dedicated OPFOR. The Active

Component installation support units will more than likely deploy with the active units. This creates an installation support void of 1,735 people (see Table 4.) There is also a 5,200 personnel dedicated OPFOR package and a 330 soldier training support package at each site.

The OPFOR package calls for a dedicated Motorized Rifle Regiment reinforced and a Motorized Rifle Battalion reinforced to complete the training model in the 102-day postmobilization cycle. Reducing the amount of OPFOR would increase the training cycle time.

The 330 personnel for the training support package would be required to run ranges, guard ranges, maintain targets and smoke generators, support lane training, and mark spots for fire support. These requirements must be filled by reserve component personnel and units.

There is also a requirement for 637 Active Component personnel to run training and training management for the brigades. Many of these active duty personnel are members of the Reserve Component Readiness Groups.

The previous chapter acknowledged four postmobilization training sites could be manned by four of the National Guard divisions. These divisions are the best available asset to facilitate and support enhanced brigade postmobilization. This is a valid mission requirement that is currently uncovered. Leaving this requirement uncovered places the current two nearly simultaneous MRC strategy at risk.

The mission would require 7,265 personnel from each of the four divisions. The divisions are currently being resourced at 85 percent of authorized force structure. It would require over 50 percent of the heavy or medium division's force structure and a little less than 75 percent of the light division's force structure to accomplish this mission. This would leave some assets of the division to respond to

natural disasters, civil disturbances or other minor state or federal contingencies.

These divisions would need to be preassigned a postmobilization training site. They would be called up before the enhanced brigades to arrive at the site and to prepare for the training of the enhanced brigades. The divisions and the active duty trainers should have a training and administration plan for each site that would facilitate the model.

TABLE 7
POSTMOBILIZATION SITE PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION

MISSION	ACTIVE REQUIREMENT	RESERVE REQUIREMENT	TOTAL REQUIREMENT
TRAINING PERSONNEL	637	N/A	637
TNG SUPPORT PERSONNEL	N/A	330	330
OPFOR	N/A	5,200	5,200
INSTALLATION AUGMENTATION	N/A	1,735	1,735
TOTAL	637	7,265	7,902

Source: RAND, Report Number DB-154-A, Postmobilization Training
Resources: A briefing for the FORSCOM Command Readiness Program, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, August 1995), 9.

The heavy and medium division could train two heavy enhanced brigade rotations. The light division could train three enhanced brigade rotations. The divisions could then stand down or start training their internal brigades one at a time. This mission would also leave the divisions as a strategic/deterrent hedge while it accomplishes a mission that is not currently defined in published military plans.

Additional Recommendations

The National Guard divisions, enhanced brigades and all reserve component units should be affiliated with an Active duty higher headquarters and assigned to a unified command. The CINC of the unified

command should oversee training and readiness of his assigned forces. This could improve the readiness of the units and provide focus for training.

Reserve component units should be fully integrated into all operational plans and called up early enough to mobilize, train, deploy to the theater, and execute the task that they are assigned. Integration of the Reserve components is a problem that must be well planned for and trained during peacetime.

Tiered levels of resource allocation lead to tiered levels of readiness. All units must be assigned missions or their force structure will be attacked by those looking to trim the Department of Defense budget. Once a unit is assigned a mission, it will need to be assigned a level of resourcing. A competent training plan must then be developed. This plan must take into consideration the unit mission and the level of resources allocated. Clear standards must be established and evaluated. These recommendations tie together the Total Force policy and today's budget constraints.

Endnotes

¹John P. White, Report on the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 May 1995), 2-23.

²John C. Marsh, Jr., U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1994), Marsh, 11.

³RAND, Report Number DB-154-A, Postmobilization Training Resources: A briefing for the FORSCOM Command Readiness Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, August 1995), 10.

⁴Ibid., 11.

⁵Ibid., 14-16.

APPENDIX A

NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION FORCE STRUCTURE ALLOCATIONS

UNIT	ARMOR DIVISION
DIV HHC	320
Military Police CO	160
Chemical CO	162
Division Band	41
Long Range Surv Det	66
Rear TOC	22
Air Defense ARTY BN	646
MI BN (CADRE)	76
Signal BN	462
HHC AVN BDE	90
Attack AVN BN	300
Cavalry SQDRN	755
GEN SPT AVN BN	330
DISCOM	234
Main Support Bn	1023
Forward Spt Bn 2X1	449
Forward Spt Bn 2X1	449
Forward Spt Bn 1x2	442
Div Avn Spt Bn	398
ENGR BDE HHD	60
ENGR BN 1	438
ENGR BN 2	438
ENGR BN 3	438
DIVARTY HHC	191
GS BTRY 155SP	100
TGT AQU BTRY	85
DS ARTY BN 2X1	641
DS ARTY BN 2X1	641
DS ARTY BN 1X2	665
1ST BDE HHC	85
TANK BN 1	615
TANK BN 2	615
MECH INF BN 1	759
2ND BDE HHC	85
TANK BN 3	615
TANK BN 4	615
MECH INF BN 2	759
3RD BDE HHC	85
TANK BN 5	615
MECH INF BN 3	759
MECH INF BN 4	759
ARMOR DIV TOTAL	16488

UNIT	MECH INFANTRY DIVISION
DIV HHC	320
Military Police CO	160
Chemical CO	162
Division Band	41
Long Range Surv Det	66
Rear TOC	22
Air Defense ARTY BN	646
MI BN (CADRE)	76
Signal BN	462
HHC AVN BDE	90
Attack AVN BN	300
Cavalry SQDRN	755
GEN SPT AVN BN	330
DISCOM	234
Main Support Bn	1023
Forward Spt Bn 2X1	449
Forward Spt Bn 1x2	442
Forward Spt Bn 1x2	442
Div Avn Spt Bn	398
ENGR BDE HHD	60
ENGR BN 1	438
ENGR BN 2	438
ENGR BN 3	438
DIVARTY HHC	191
GS BTRY 155SP	100
TGT AQU BTRY	85
DS ARTY BN 2X1	641
DS ARTY BN 1X2	665
DS ARTY BN 1X2	665
1ST BDE HHC	85
TANK BN 1	615
TANK BN 2	615
MECH INF BN 1	759
2ND BDE HHC	85
TANK BN 3	615
MECH INF BN 2	759
MECH INF BN 3	759
3RD BDE HHC	85
TANK BN 4	615
MECH INF BN 4	759
MECH INF BN 5	759
MECH DIV TOTAL	16649

Source: HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, SAMAS Database, November 1995.

APPENDIX B

NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION FORCE STRUCTURE ALLOCATION

UNIT	MEDIUM DIVISION
DIV HHC	274
MP CO	153
CHEM CO	162
DIV BAND	41
LRSD	66
RTOC	19
ADA BN	655
MI BN (CADRE)	76
SIG BN	474
HHC AVN BDE	83
ATTACK BN	277
CAV SQDRN	539
GEN SPT AVN BN	327
DISCOM	221
Main Support Bn	1107
Fwd Spt Bn (AASLT)	396
Forward Spt Bn 2X1	465
Forward Spt Bn 1x2	593
Div Avn Spt Bn	450
ENGR BDE HHD	55
ENGR BN 1	433
ENGR BN 2	433
ENGR CO	165
DIVARTY HHC	185
GS BTRY 155SP	142
TGT AQU BTRY	79
DS BN 2X1	735
DS BN 1X2	760
DS BN (105MM TOWED)	465
1ST BDE HHC	81
INF BN W/ AASLT TOE	678
INF BN W/ AASLT TOE	678
INF BN W/ AASLT TOE	678
2ND BDE HHC	81
TANK BN 1	540
TANK BN 2	540
MECH INF BN 1	766
3RD BDE HHC	81
TANK BN 3	540
MECH INF BN 2	766
MECH INF BN 3	766
MDM DIV TOTAL	16025

UNIT	LIGHT DIVISION
DIV HHC	230
MP CO	81
DIV BAND	41
RTOC	19
ADA BN	333
MI BN (CADRE)	76
SIG BN	564
HHC AVN BDE	179
ATTACK BN	242
CAV SQDRN	261
ASLT HEL BN	351
DISCOM	135
Main Support Bn	417
Forward Spt Bn	192
Forward Spt Bn	192
Forward Spt Bn	192
AV MAINT SPT CO	293
ENGR BN	400
DIVARTY HHC	110
GS BTRY 155 T	142
DS ARTY BN 105 T	414
DS ARTY BN 105 T	414
DS ARTY BN 105 T	414
1ST BDE HHC	76
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT INF BN	569
2ND BDE HHC	76
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT INF BN	569
3RD BDE HHC	76
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT INF BN	569
LIGHT DIV TOTAL	11041

Source: HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, SAMAS Database, November 1995.

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
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